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Abstract
Sequential decision theory formally solves the problem of rational agents in
uncertain worlds if the true environmental prior probability distribution is
known. Solomonoff’s theory of universal induction formally solves the problem
of sequence prediction for unknown prior distribution. We combine both
ideas and get a parameter-free theory of universal Artificial Intelligence. We
give strong arguments that the resulting AIXI model is the most intelligent
unbiased agent possible. We outline how the AIXI model can formally solve
a number of problem classes, including sequence prediction, strategic games,
function minimization, reinforcement and supervised learning. The major
drawback of the AIXI model is that it is uncomputable. To overcome this
problem, we construct a modified algorithm AIXItl that is still effectively
more intelligent than any other time t and length l bounded agent. The
computation time of AIXItl is of the order t·2l. The discussion includes formal
definitions of intelligence order relations, the horizon problem and relations
of the AIXI theory to other AI approaches.
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1 Introduction
This article gives an introduction to a mathematical theory for intelligence. We
present the AIXI model, a parameter-free optimal reinforcement learning agent em-
bedded in an arbitrary unknown environment.
The science of Artificial Intelligence (AI) may be defined as the construction of
intelligent systems and their analysis. A natural definition of a system is anything
that has an input and an output stream. Intelligence is more complicated. It can
have many faces like creativity, solving problems, pattern recognition, classification,
learning, induction, deduction, building analogies, optimization, surviving in an
environment, language processing, knowledge and many more. A formal definition
incorporating every aspect of intelligence, however, seems difficult. Most, if not all
known facets of intelligence can be formulated as goal-driven or, more precisely, as
maximizing some utility function. It is, therefore, sufficient to study goal-driven AI;
e.g. the (biological) goal of animals and humans is to survive and spread. The goal
of AI systems should be to be useful to humans. The problem is that, except for
special cases, we know neither the utility function nor the environment in which the
agent will operate in advance. The mathematical theory, coined AIXI, is supposed
to solve these problems.
Assume the availability of unlimited computational resources. The first impor-
tant observation is that this does not make the AI problem trivial. Playing chess
optimally or solving NP-complete problems become trivial, but driving a car or
surviving in nature don’t. This is because it is a challenge itself to well-define the
latter problems, not to mention presenting an algorithm. In other words: The AI
problem has not yet been well defined. One may view AIXI as a suggestion for such
a mathematical definition of AI.
AIXI is a universal theory of sequential decision making akin to Solomonoff’s
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celebrated universal theory of induction. Solomonoff derived an optimal way of pre-
dicting future data, given previous perceptions, provided the data is sampled from
a computable probability distribution. AIXI extends this approach to an optimal
decision making agent embedded in an unknown environment. The main idea is
to replace the unknown environmental distribution µ in the Bellman equations by
a suitably generalized universal Solomonoff distribution ξ. The state space is the
space of complete histories. AIXI is a universal theory without adjustable parame-
ters, making no assumptions about the environment except that it is sampled from
a computable distribution. From an algorithmic complexity perspective, the AIXI
model generalizes optimal passive universal induction to the case of active agents.
From a decision-theoretic perspective, AIXI is a suggestion of a new (implicit) “learn-
ing” algorithm, which may overcome all (except computational) problems of previous
reinforcement learning algorithms.
There are strong arguments that AIXI is the most intelligent unbiased agent
possible. We outline for a number of problem classes, including sequence prediction,
strategic games, function minimization, reinforcement and supervised learning, how
the AIXI model can formally solve them. The major drawback of the AIXI model
is that it is incomputable. To overcome this problem, we construct a modified
algorithm AIXItl that is still effectively more intelligent than any other time t and
length l bounded agent. The computation time of AIXItl is of the order t·2l. Other
discussed topics are a formal definition of an intelligence order relation, the horizon
problem and relations of the AIXI theory to other AI approaches.
The article is meant to be a gentle introduction to and discussion of the AIXI
model. For a mathematically rigorous treatment, many subtleties, and proofs see
the references to the author’s works in the annotated bibliography section at the
end of this article, and in particular the book [Hut04]. This section also provides
references to introductory textbooks and original publications on algorithmic infor-
mation theory and sequential decision theory.
Chapter 2 presents the theory of sequential decisions in a very general form
(called AIµ model) in which actions and perceptions may depend on arbitrary past
events. We clarify the connection to the Bellman equations and discuss minor pa-
rameters including (the size of) the I/O spaces and the lifetime of the agent and
their universal choice which we have in mind. Optimality of AIµ is obvious by
construction.
Chapter 3: How and in which sense induction is possible at all has been subject
to long philosophical controversies. Highlights are Epicurus’ principle of multiple
explanations, Occam’s razor, and probability theory. Solomonoff elegantly unified
all these aspects into one formal theory of inductive inference based on a univer-
sal probability distribution ξ, which is closely related to Kolmogorov complexity
K(x), the length of the shortest program computing x. Rapid convergence of ξ to
the unknown true environmental distribution µ and tight loss bounds for arbitrary
bounded loss functions and finite alphabet can be shown. Pareto optimality of ξ
in the sense that there is no other predictor that performs better or equal in all
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environments and strictly better in at least one can also be shown. In view of these
results it is fair to say that the problem of sequence prediction possesses a universally
optimal solution.
Chapter 4: In the active case, reinforcement learning algorithms are usually used
if µ is unknown. They can succeed if the state space is either small or has effec-
tively been made small by generalization techniques. The algorithms work only in
restricted (e.g. Markovian) domains, have problems with optimally trading off explo-
ration versus exploitation, have nonoptimal learning rate, are prone to diverge, or are
otherwise ad hoc. The formal solution proposed here is to generalize Solomonoff’s
universal prior ξ to include action conditions and replace µ by ξ in the AIµ model,
resulting in the AIξ≡AIXI model, which we claim to be universally optimal. We
investigate what we can expect from a universally optimal agent and clarify the
meanings of universal, optimal, etc. Other discussed topics are formal definitions of
an intelligence order relation, the horizon problem, and Pareto optimality of AIXI.
Chapter 5: We show how a number of AI problem classes fit into the general AIXI
model. They include sequence prediction, strategic games, function minimization,
and supervised learning. We first formulate each problem class in its natural way
(for known µ) and then construct a formulation within the AIµ model and show
their equivalence. We then consider the consequences of replacing µ by ξ. The main
goal is to understand in which sense the problems are solved by AIXI.
Chapter 6: The major drawback of AIXI is that it is incomputable, or more
precisely, only asymptotically computable, which makes an implementation impos-
sible. To overcome this problem, we construct a modified model AIXItl, which is
still superior to any other time t and length l bounded algorithm. The computa-
tion time of AIXItl is of the order t·2l. The solution requires an implementation of
first-order logic, the definition of a universal Turing machine within it and a proof
theory system.
Chapter 7: Finally we discuss and remark on some otherwise unmentioned top-
ics of general interest. We remark on various topics, including concurrent actions
and perceptions, the choice of the I/O spaces, treatment of encrypted informa-
tion, and peculiarities of mortal embodies agents. We continue with an outlook
on further research, including optimality, down-scaling, implementation, approxi-
mation, elegance, extra knowledge, and training of/for AIXI(tl). We also include
some (personal) remarks on non-computable physics, the number of wisdom Ω, and
consciousness.
An annotated bibliography and other references conclude this work.
2 Agents in Known Probabilistic Environments
The general framework for AI might be viewed as the design and study of intelligent
agents [RN03]. An agent is a cybernetic system with some internal state, which acts
with output yk on some environment in cycle k, perceives some input xk from the en-
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vironment and updates its internal state. Then the next cycle follows. We split the
input xk into a regular part ok and a reward rk, often called reinforcement feedback.
From time to time the environment provides nonzero reward to the agent. The task
of the agent is to maximize its utility, defined as the sum of future rewards. A proba-
bilistic environment can be described by the conditional probability µ for the inputs
x1...xn to the agent under the condition that the agent outputs y1...yn. Most, if not
all environments are of this type. We give formal expressions for the outputs of the
agent, which maximize the total µ-expected reward sum, called value. This model
is called the AIµ model. As every AI problem can be brought into this form, the
problem of maximizing utility is hence being formally solved, if µ is known. Further-
more, we study some special aspects of the AIµ model. We introduce factorizable
probability distributions describing environments with independent episodes. They
occur in several problem classes studied in Section 5 and are a special case of more
general separable probability distributions defined in Section 4.3. We also clarify
the connection to the Bellman equations of sequential decision theory and discuss
similarities and differences. We discuss minor parameters of our model, including
(the size of) the input and output spaces X and Y and the lifetime of the agent, and
their universal choice, which we have in mind. There is nothing remarkable in this
section; it is the essence of sequential decision theory [NM44, Bel57, BT96, SB98],
presented in a new form. Notation and formulas needed in later sections are simply
developed. There are two major remaining problems: the problem of the unknown
true probability distribution µ, which is solved in Section 4, and computational
aspects, which are addressed in Section 6.
2.1 The Cybernetic Agent Model
A good way to start thinking about intelligent systems is to consider more generally
cybernetic systems, in AI usually called agents. This avoids having to struggle
with the meaning of intelligence from the very beginning. A cybernetic system is a
control circuit with input y and output x and an internal state. From an external
input and the internal state the agent calculates deterministically or stochastically
an output. This output (action) modifies the environment and leads to a new input
(perception). This continues ad infinitum or for a finite number of cycles.
Definition 1 (The Agent Model) An agent is a system that interacts with an
environment in cycles k = 1,2,3,.... In cycle k the action (output) yk ∈ Y of the
agent is determined by a policy p that depends on the I/O-history y1x1...yk−1xk−1.
The environment reacts to this action and leads to a new perception (input) xk∈X
determined by a deterministic function q or probability distribution µ, which depends
on the history y1x1...yk−1xk−1yk. Then the next cycle k+1 starts.
As explained in the last section, we need some reward assignment to the cybernetic
system. The input x is divided into two parts, the standard input o and some reward
input r. If input and output are represented by strings, a deterministic cybernetic
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system can be modeled by a Turing machine p, where p is called the policy of the
agent, which determines the (re)action to a perception. If the environment is also
computable it might be modeled by a Turing machine q as well. The interaction of
the agent with the environment can be illustrated as follows:
r1 | o1 r2 | o2 r3 | o3 r4 | o4 r5 | o5 r6 | o6 ...
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 ...
work
Agent
p
tape ... work
Environ-
ment q
tape ...
 HH
HH
HHY



1PPPPPPPPq
Both p as well as q have unidirectional input and output tapes and bidirectional
work tapes. What entangles the agent with the environment is the fact that the
upper tape serves as input tape for p, as well as output tape for q, and that the lower
tape serves as output tape for p as well as input tape for q. Further, the reading
head must always be left of the writing head, i.e. the symbols must first be written
before they are read. Both p and q have their own mutually inaccessible work tapes
containing their own “secrets”. The heads move in the following way. In the kth
cycle p writes yk, q reads yk, q writes xk≡ rkok, p reads xk≡ rkok, followed by the
(k+1)th cycle and so on. The whole process starts with the first cycle, all heads on
tape start and work tapes being empty. We call Turing machines behaving in this
way chronological Turing machines. Before continuing, some notations on strings
are appropriate.
2.2 Strings
We denote strings over the alphabet X by s= x1x2...xn, with xk ∈X , where X is
alternatively interpreted as a nonempty subset of IN or itself as a prefix-free set of
binary strings. The length of s is ℓ(s)=ℓ(x1)+...+ℓ(xn). Analogous definitions hold
for yk∈Y . We call xk the kth input word and yk the kth output word (rather than
letter). The string s=y1x1...ynxn represents the input/output in chronological order.
Due to the prefix property of the xk and yk, s can be uniquely separated into its
words. The words appearing in strings are always in chronological order. We further
introduce the following abbreviations: ǫ is the empty string, xn:m :=xnxn+1...xm−1xm
for n≤m and ǫ for n>m. x<n :=x1...xn−1. Analogously for y. Further, yxn :=ynxn,
yxn:m :=ynxn...ymxm, and so on.
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2.3 AI Model for Known Deterministic Environment
Let us define for the chronological Turing machine p a partial function also named
p : X ∗→Y∗ with y1:k = p(x<k), where y1:k is the output of Turing machine p on
input x<k in cycle k, i.e. where p has read up to xk−1 but no further.1 In an anal-
ogous way, we define q :Y∗→X ∗ with x1:k = q(y1:k). Conversely, for every partial
recursive chronological function we can define a corresponding chronological Tur-
ing machine. Each (agent,environment) pair (p,q) produces a unique I/O sequence
ωpq :=ypq1 x
pq
1 y
pq
2 x
pq
2 .... When we look at the definitions of p and q we see a nice sym-
metry between the cybernetic system and the environment. Until now, not much
intelligence is in our agent. Now the credit assignment comes into the game and
removes the symmetry somewhat. We split the input xk∈X :=R×O into a regular
part ok∈O and a reward rk∈R⊂IR. We define xk≡rkok and rk≡r(xk). The goal
of the agent should be to maximize received rewards. This is called reinforcement
learning. The reason for the asymmetry is that eventually we (humans) will be the
environment with which the agent will communicate and we want to dictate what
is good and what is wrong, not the other way round. This one-way learning, the
agent learns from the environment, and not conversely, neither prevents the agent
from becoming more intelligent than the environment, nor does it prevent the en-
vironment learning from the agent because the environment can itself interpret the
outputs yk as a regular and a reward part. The environment is just not forced to
learn, whereas the agent is. In cases where we restrict the reward to two values
r∈R=IB :={0,1}, r=1 is interpreted as a positive feedback, called good or correct,
and r=0 a negative feedback, called bad or error. Further, let us restrict for a while
the lifetime (number of cycles) m of the agent to a large but finite value. Let
V pqkm :=
m∑
i=k
r(xpqi )
be the future total reward (called future utility), the agent p receives from the
environment q in the cycles k to m. It is now natural to call the agent p∗ that
maximizes V1m (called total utility), the best one.
2
p∗ := argmax
p
V pq1m ⇒ V p
∗q
km ≥ V pqkm ∀p : ypq<k = yp
∗q
<k (1)
For k = 1 the condition on p is nil. For k > 1 it states that p shall be consistent
with p∗ in the sense that they have the same history. If X , Y and m are finite, the
number of different behaviors of the agent, i.e. the search space is finite. Therefore,
because we have assumed that q is known, p∗ can effectively be determined by pre-
analyzing all behaviors. The main reason for restricting to finite m was not to
1Note that a possible additional dependence of p on y<k as mentioned in Definition 1 can be
eliminated by recursive substitution; see below. Similarly for q.
2argmaxpV (p) is the p that maximizes V (·). If there is more than one maximum we might
choose the lexicographically smallest one for definiteness.
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ensure computability of p∗ but that the limit m→∞ might not exist. The ease
with which we defined and computed the optimal policy p∗ is not remarkable. Just
the (unrealistic) assumption of a completely known deterministic environment q has
trivialized everything.
2.4 AI Model for Known Prior Probability
Let us now weaken our assumptions by replacing the deterministic environment q
with a probability distribution µ(q) over chronological functions. Here µ might be
interpreted in two ways. Either the environment itself behaves stochastically defined
by µ or the true environment is deterministic, but we only have subjective (proba-
bilistic) information of which environment is the true environment. Combinations
of both cases are also possible. We assume here that µ is known and describes
the true stochastic behavior of the environment. The case of unknown µ with the
agent having some beliefs about the environment lies at the heart of the AIξ model
described in Section 4.
The best or most intelligent agent is now the one that maximizes the expected
utility (called value function) V pµ ≡V pµ1m :=
∑
qµ(q)V
pq
1m. This defines the AIµ model.
Definition 2 (The AIµ model) The AIµ model is the agent with policy pµ that
maximizes the µ-expected total reward r1+ ...+rm, i.e. p
∗ ≡ pµ := argmaxpV pµ . Its
value is V ∗µ :=V
pµ
µ .
We need the concept of a value function in a slightly more general form.
Definition 3 (The µ/true/generating value function) The agent’s perception
x consists of a regular observation o∈O and a reward r ∈R⊂ IR. In cycle k the
value V pµkm(yx<k) is defined as the µ-expectation of the future reward sum rk+...+rm
with actions generated by policy p, and fixed history yx<k. We say that V
pµ
km(yx<k) is
the (future) value of policy p in environment µ given history yx<k, or shorter, the µ
or true or generating value of p given yx<k. V
p
µ :=V
pµ
1m is the (total) value of p.
We now give a more formal definition for V pµkm. Let us assume we are in cycle k with
history y˙x˙1...y˙x˙k−1 and ask for the best output yk. Further, let Q˙k :={q :q(y˙<k)=x˙<k}
be the set of all environments producing the above history. We say that q∈ Q˙k is
consistent with history y˙x˙<k. The expected reward for the next m−k+1 cycles
(given the above history) is called the value of policy p and is given by a conditional
probability:
V pµkm(y˙x˙<k) :=
∑
q∈Q˙k µ(q)V
pq
km∑
q∈Q˙k µ(q)
. (2)
Policy p and environment µ do not determine history y˙x˙<k, unlike the deterministic
case, because the history is no longer deterministically determined by p and q, but
depends on p and µ and on the outcome of a stochastic process. Every new cycle
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adds new information (x˙i) to the agent. This is indicated by the dots over the
symbols. In cycle k we have to maximize the expected future rewards, taking into
account the information in the history y˙x˙<k. This information is not already present
in p and q/µ at the agent’s start, unlike in the deterministic case.
Furthermore, we want to generalize the finite lifetime m to a dynamic (com-
putable) farsightedness hk≡mk−k+1≥1, called horizon. For mk=m we have our
original finite lifetime; for hk = h the agent maximizes in every cycle the next h
expected rewards. A discussion of the choices for mk is delayed to Section 4.5. The
next hk rewards are maximized by
p∗k := argmax
p∈P˙k
V pµkmk(y˙x˙<k),
where P˙k :={p :∃yk :p(x˙<k)= y˙<kyk} is the set of systems consistent with the current
history. Note that p∗k depends on k and is used only in step k to determine y˙k
by p∗k(x˙<k|y˙<k) = y˙<ky˙k. After writing y˙k the environment replies with x˙k with
(conditional) probability µ(Q˙k+1)/µ(Q˙k). This probabilistic outcome provides new
information to the agent. The cycle k+1 starts with determining y˙k+1 from p
∗
k+1
(which can differ from p∗k for dynamic mk) and so on. Note that p
∗
k implicitly also
depends on y˙<k because P˙k and Q˙k do so. But recursively inserting p
∗
k−1 and so on,
we can define
p∗(x˙<k) := p∗k(x˙<k|p∗k−1(x˙<k−1|...p∗1)) (3)
It is a chronological function and computable if X , Y and mk are finite and µ is
computable. For constant m one can show that the policy (3) coincides with the
AIµ model (Definition 2). This also proves
V ∗µkm(yx<k) ≥ V pµkm(yx<k) ∀p consistent with yx<k (4)
similarly to (1). For k = 1 this is obvious. We also call (3) AIµ model. For de-
terministic3 µ this model reduces to the deterministic case discussed in the last
subsection.
It is important to maximize the sum of future rewards and not, for instance, to be
greedy and only maximize the next reward, as is done e.g. in sequence prediction.
For example, let the environment be a sequence of chess games, and each cycle
corresponds to one move. Only at the end of each game is a positive reward r=1
given to the agent if it won the game (and made no illegal move). For the agent,
maximizing all future rewards means trying to win as many games in as short as
possible time (and avoiding illegal moves). The same performance is reached if we
choose hk much larger than the typical game lengths. Maximization of only the next
reward would be a very bad chess playing agent. Even if we would make our reward
r finer, e.g. by evaluating the number of chessmen, the agent would play very bad
chess for hk=1, indeed.
3We call a probability distribution deterministic if it assumes values 0 and 1 only.
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The AIµ model still depends on µ and mk; mk is addressed in Section 4.5. To get
our final universal AI model the idea is to replace µ by the universal probability ξ,
defined later. This is motivated by the fact that ξ converges to µ in a certain sense for
any µ. With ξ instead of µ our model no longer depends on any parameters, so it is
truly universal. It remains to show that it behaves intelligently. But let us continue
step by step. In the following we develop an alternative but equivalent formulation
of the AIµ model. Whereas the functional form presented above is more suitable for
theoretical considerations, especially for the development of a time-bounded version
in Section 6, the iterative and recursive formulation of the next subsections will be
more appropriate for the explicit calculations in most of the other sections.
2.5 Probability Distributions
We use Greek letters for probability distributions, and underline their arguments
to indicate that they are probability arguments. Let ρn(x1...xn) be the probability
that an (infinite) string starts with x1...xn. We drop the index on ρ if it is clear
from its arguments:
∑
xn∈X
ρ(x1:n) ≡
∑
xn
ρn(x1:n) = ρn−1(x<n) ≡ ρ(x<n), ρ(ǫ) ≡ ρ0(ǫ) = 1. (5)
We also need conditional probabilities derived from the chain rule. We prefer a nota-
tion that preserves the chronological order of the words, in contrast to the standard
notation ρ(·|·) that flips it. We extend the definition of ρ to the conditional case with
the following convention for its arguments: An underlined argument xk is a proba-
bility variable, and other non-underlined arguments xk represent conditions. With
this convention, the conditional probability has the form ρ(x<nxn)=ρ(x1:n)/ρ(x<n).
The equation states that the probability that a string x1...xn−1 is followed by xn is
equal to the probability of x1...xn∗ divided by the probability of x1...xn−1∗. We use
x∗ as an abbreviation for ‘strings starting with x’.
The introduced notation is also suitable for defining the conditional probability
ρ(y1x1...ynxn) that the environment reacts with x1...xn under the condition that the
output of the agent is y1...yn. The environment is chronological, i.e. input xi depends
on yx<iyi only. In the probabilistic case this means that ρ(yx<kyk) :=
∑
xkρ(yx1:k)
is independent of yk, hence a tailing yk in the arguments of ρ can be dropped.
Probability distributions with this property will be called chronological. The y are
always conditions, i.e. are never underlined, whereas additional conditioning for the
x can be obtained with the chain rule
ρ(yx<nyxn) = ρ(yx1:n)/ρ(yx<n) and (6)
ρ(yx1:n) = ρ(yx1)·ρ(yx1yx2)· ... ·ρ(yx<nyxn).
The second equation is the first equation applied n times.
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2.6 Explicit Form of the AIµ Model
Let us define the AIµ model p∗ in a different way: Let µ(yx<kyxk) be the true
probability of input xk in cycle k, given the history yx<kyk; µ(yx1:k) is the true
chronological prior probability that the environment reacts with x1:k if provided
with actions y1:k from the agent. We assume the cybernetic model depicted on
page 7 to be valid. Next we define the value V ∗µk+1,m(yx1:k) to be the µ-expected
reward sum rk+1+...+rm in cycles k+1 to m with outputs yi generated by agent p
∗
that maximizes the expected reward sum, and responses xi from the environment,
drawn according to µ. Adding r(xk)≡rk we get the reward including cycle k. The
probability of xk, given yx<kyk, is given by the conditional probability µ(yx<kyxk).
So the expected reward sum in cycles k to m given yx<kyk is
V ∗µkm(yx<kyk) :=
∑
xk
[r(xk) + V
∗µ
k+1,m(yx1:k)]·µ(yx<kyxk) (7)
Now we ask how p∗ chooses yk: It should choose yk as to maximize the future
rewards. So the expected reward in cycles k to m given yx<k and yk chosen by p
∗ is
V ∗µkm(yx<k) :=maxykV
∗µ
km(yx<kyk) (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4 (Expectimax Tree/Algorithm for O=Y=IB)
Together with the induction start
V ∗µm+1,m(yx1:m) := 0 (8)
V ∗µkm is completely defined. We might summarize one cycle into the formula
V ∗µkm(yx<k) = maxyk
∑
xk
[r(xk) + V
∗µ
k+1,m(yx1:k)]·µ(yx<kyxk) (9)
We introduce a dynamic (computable) farsightedness hk ≡ mk−k+1 ≥ 1, called
horizon. For mk =m, where m is the lifetime of the agent, we achieve optimal
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behavior, for limited farsightedness hk=h (m=mk=h+k−1), the agent maximizes
in every cycle the next h expected rewards. A discussion of the choices for mk is
delayed to Section 4.5. If mk is our horizon function of p
∗ and y˙x˙<k is the actual
history in cycle k, the output y˙k of the agent is explicitly given by
y˙k = argmax
yk
V ∗µkmk(y˙x˙<kyk) (10)
which in turn defines the policy p∗. Then the environment responds x˙k with proba-
bility µ(y˙x˙<ky˙x˙k). Then cycle k+1 starts. We might unfold the recursion (9) further
and give y˙k nonrecursively as
y˙k ≡ y˙µk := argmaxyk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ymk
∑
xmk
(r(xk)+ ...+r(xmk))·µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk) (11)
This has a direct interpretation: The probability of inputs xk:mk in cycle k when the
agent outputs yk:mk with actual history y˙x˙<k is µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk). The future reward in
this case is r(xk)+...+r(xmk). The best expected reward is obtained by averaging
over the xi (
∑
xi) and maximizing over the yi. This has to be done in chronological
order to correctly incorporate the dependencies of xi and yi on the history. This is
essentially the expectimax algorithm/tree [Mic66, RN03]. The AIµ model is optimal
in the sense that no other policy leads to higher expected reward. The value for a
general policy p can be written in the form
V pµkm(yx<k) :=
∑
x1:m
(rk+ ...+rm)µ(yx<kyxk:m)|y1:m=p(x<m) (12)
As is clear from their interpretations, the iterative environmental probability µ re-
lates to the functional form in the following way:
µ(yx1:k) =
∑
q:q(y1:k)=x1:k
µ(q) (13)
With this identification one can show [Hut00, Hut04] the following:
Theorem 5 (Equivalence of functional and explicit AI model) The actions
of the functional AI model (3) coincide with the actions of the explicit (recur-
sive/iterative) AI model (9)–(11) with environments identified by (13).
2.7 Factorizable Environments
Up to now we have made no restrictions on the form of the prior probability µ apart
from being a chronological probability distribution. On the other hand, we will see
that, in order to prove rigorous reward bounds, the prior probability must satisfy
some separability condition to be defined later. Here we introduce a very strong
form of separability, when µ factorizes into products.
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Assume that the cycles are grouped into independent episodes r=1,2,3,..., where
each episode r consists of the cycles k=nr+1,...,nr+1 for some 0=n0<n1<...<ns=n:
µ(yx1:n) =
s−1∏
r=0
µr(yxnr+1:nr+1) (14)
(In the simplest case, when all episodes have the same length l then nr=r·l). Then
y˙k depends on µr and x and y of episode r only, with r such that nr<k≤nr+1. One
can show that
y˙k = argmax
yk
V ∗µkmk(y˙x˙<kyk) = argmaxyk
V ∗µkt (y˙x˙<kyk) (15)
with t :=min{mk,nr+1}. The different episodes are completely independent in the
sense that the inputs xk of different episodes are statistically independent and depend
only on the outputs yk of the same episode. The outputs yk depend on the x and
y of the corresponding episode r only, and are independent of the actual I/O of the
other episodes.
Note that y˙k is also independent of the choice of mk, as long as mk is sufficiently
large. If all episodes have a length of at most l, i.e. nr+1−nr≤ l and if we choose
the horizon hk to be at least l, then mk≥k+l−1≥nr+l≥nr+1 and hence t=nr+1
independent of mk. This means that for factorizable µ there is no problem in taking
the limit mk→∞. Maybe this limit can also be performed in the more general case
of a sufficiently separable µ. The (problem of the) choice of mk will be discussed in
more detail later.
Although factorizable µ are too restrictive to cover all AI problems, they often
occur in practice in the form of repeated problem solving, and hence, are worthy
of study. For example, if the agent has to play games like chess repeatedly, or has
to minimize different functions, the different games/functions might be completely
independent, i.e. the environmental probability factorizes, where each factor corre-
sponds to a game/function minimization. For details, see the appropriate sections
on strategic games and function minimization.
Further, for factorizable µ it is probably easier to derive suitable reward bounds
for the universal AIξ model defined in the next section, than for the separable cases
that will be introduced later. This could be a first step toward a definition and
proof for the general case of separable problems. One goal of this paragraph was to
show that the notion of a factorizable µ could be the first step toward a definition
and analysis of the general case of separable µ.
2.8 Constants and Limits
We have in mind a universal agent with complex interactions that is at least as
intelligent and complex as a human being. One might think of an agent whose
input yk comes from a digital video camera, and the output xk is some image to a
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monitor,4 only for the rewards we might restrict to the most primitive binary ones,
i.e. rk∈IB. So we think of the following constant sizes:
1 ≪ 〈ℓ(ykxk)〉 ≪ k ≤ m ≪ |Y × X |
1 ≪ 216 ≪ 224 ≤ 232 ≪ 265536
The first two limits say that the actual number k of inputs/outputs should be
reasonably large compared to the typical length 〈ℓ〉 of the input/output words,
which itself should be rather sizeable. The last limit expresses the fact that the
total lifetime m (number of I/O cycles) of the agent is far too small to allow every
possible input to occur, or to try every possible output, or to make use of identically
repeated inputs or outputs. We do not expect any useful outputs for k<∼〈ℓ〉. More
interesting than the lengths of the inputs is the complexity K(x1...xk) of all inputs
until now, to be defined later. The environment is usually not “perfect”. The agent
could either interact with an imperfect human or tackle a nondeterministic world
(due to quantum mechanics or chaos).5 In either case, the sequence contains some
noise, leading toK(x1...xk)∝〈ℓ〉·k. The complexity of the probability distribution of
the input sequence is something different. We assume that this noisy world operates
according to some simple computable rules. K(µk)≪ 〈ℓ〉·k, i.e. the rules of the
world can be highly compressed. We may allow environments in which new aspects
appear for k→∞, causing a non-bounded K(µk).
In the following we never use these limits, except when explicitly stated. In some
simpler models and examples the size of the constants will even violate these limits
(e.g. ℓ(xk)=ℓ(yk)=1), but it is the limits above that the reader should bear in mind.
We are only interested in theorems that do not degenerate under the above limits.
In order to avoid cumbersome convergence and existence considerations we make
the following assumptions throughout this work:
Assumption 6 (Finiteness) We assume that
• the input/perception space X is finite,
• the output/action space Y is finite,
• the rewards are nonnegative and bounded, i.e. rk∈R⊆ [0,rmax],
• the horizon m is finite.
Finite X and bounded R (each separately) ensure existence of µ-expectations but
are sometimes needed together. Finite Y ensures that argmaxyk∈Y [...] exists, i.e.
that maxima are attained, while finite m avoids various technical and philosophical
problems (Section 4.5), and positive rewards are needed for the time-bounded AIXItl
model (Section 6). Many theorems can be generalized by relaxing some or all of the
above finiteness assumptions.
4Humans can only simulate a screen as output device by drawing pictures.
5Whether there exist truly stochastic processes at all is a difficult question. At least the quantum
indeterminacy comes very close to it.
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2.9 Sequential Decision Theory
One can relate (9) to the Bellman equations [Bel57] of sequential decision theory by
identifying complete histories yx<k with states, µ(yx<kyxk) with the state transition
matrix, V ∗µ with the value function, and yk with the action in cycle k [BT96, RN03].
Due to the use of complete histories as state space, the AIµ model neither assumes
stationarity, nor the Markov property, nor complete accessibility of the environment.
Every state occurs at most once in the lifetime of the system. For this and other
reasons the explicit formulation (11) is more natural and useful here than to enforce
a pseudo-recursive Bellman equation form.
As we have in mind a universal system with complex interactions, the action
and perception spaces Y and X are huge (e.g. video images), and every action or
perception itself occurs usually only once in the lifespan m of the agent. As there is
no (obvious) universal similarity relation on the state space, an effective reduction
of its size is impossible, but there is no principle problem in determining yk from
(11) as long as µ is known and computable, and X , Y and m are finite.
Things drastically change if µ is unknown. Reinforcement learning algorithms
[KLM96, SB98, BT96] are commonly used in this case to learn the unknown µ or
directly its value. They succeed if the state space is either small or has effectively
been made small by generalization or function approximation techniques. In any
case, the solutions are either ad hoc, work in restricted domains only, have serious
problems with state space exploration versus exploitation, or are prone to diverge,
or have nonoptimal learning rates. There is no universal and optimal solution to
this problem so far. The central theme of this article is to present a new model
and argue that it formally solves all these problems in an optimal way. The true
probability distribution µ will not be learned directly, but will be replaced by some
generalized universal prior ξ, which converges to µ.
3 Universal Sequence Prediction
This section deals with the question of how to make predictions in unknown environ-
ments. Following a brief description of important philosophical attitudes regarding
inductive reasoning and inference, we describe more accurately what we mean by
induction, and motivate why we can focus on sequence prediction tasks. The most
important concept is Occam’s razor (simplicity) principle. Indeed, one can show
that the best way to make predictions is based on the shortest (=̂ simplest) descrip-
tion of the data sequence seen so far. The most general effective descriptions can be
obtained with the help of general recursive functions, or equivalently by using pro-
grams on Turing machines, especially on the universal Turing machine. The length
of the shortest program describing the data is called the Kolmogorov complexity
of the data. Probability theory is needed to deal with uncertainty. The environ-
ment may be a stochastic process (e.g. gambling houses or quantum physics) that
can be described by “objective” probabilities. But also uncertain knowledge about
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the environment, which leads to beliefs about it, can be modeled by “subjective”
probabilities. The old question left open by subjectivists of how to choose the a
priori probabilities is solved by Solomonoff’s universal prior, which is closely related
to Kolmogorov complexity. Solomonoff’s major result is that the universal (subjec-
tive) posterior converges to the true (objective) environment(al probability) µ. The
only assumption on µ is that µ (which needs not be known!) is computable. The
problem of the unknown environment µ is hence solved for all problems of inductive
type, like sequence prediction and classification.
3.1 Introduction
An important and highly nontrivial aspect of intelligence is inductive inference.
Simply speaking, induction is the process of predicting the future from the past, or
more precisely, it is the process of finding rules in (past) data and using these rules to
guess future data. Weather or stock-market forecasting, or continuing number series
in an IQ test are nontrivial examples. Making good predictions plays a central role in
natural and artificial intelligence in general, and in machine learning in particular.
All induction problems can be phrased as sequence prediction tasks. This is, for
instance, obvious for time-series prediction, but also includes classification tasks.
Having observed data xt at times t<n, the task is to predict the n
th symbol xn from
sequence x1...xn−1. This prequential approach [Daw84] skips over the intermediate
step of learning a model based on observed data x1...xn−1 and then using this model
to predict xn. The prequential approach avoids problems of model consistency,
how to separate noise from useful data, and many other issues. The goal is to
make “good” predictions, where the prediction quality is usually measured by a
loss function, which shall be minimized. The key concept to well-define and solve
induction problems is Occam’s razor (simplicity) principle, which says that “Entities
should not be multiplied beyond necessity,” which may be interpreted as to keep the
simplest theory consistent with the observations x1...xn−1 and to use this theory to
predict xn. Before we can present Solomonoff’s formal solution, we have to quantify
Occam’s razor in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, and introduce the notion of
subjective/objective probabilities.
3.2 Algorithmic Information Theory
Intuitively, a string is simple if it can be described in a few words, like “the string
of one million ones”, and is complex if there is no such short description, like for
a random string whose shortest description is specifying it bit by bit. We can
restrict the discussion to binary strings, since for other (non-stringy mathematical)
objects we may assume some default coding as binary strings. Furthermore, we are
only interested in effective descriptions, and hence restrict decoders to be Turing
machines. Let us choose some universal (so-called prefix) Turing machine U with
unidirectional binary input and output tapes and a bidirectional work tape [LV97,
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Hut04]. We can then define the (conditional) prefix Kolmogorov complexity [Cha75,
Ga´c74, Kol65, Lev74] of a binary string x as the length l of the shortest program p,
for which U outputs the binary string x (given y)
Definition 7 (Kolmogorov complexity) Let U be a universal prefix Turing ma-
chine U . The (conditional) prefix Kolmogorov complexity is defined as the shortest
program p, for which U outputs x (given y):
K(x) := min
p
{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x}, K(x|y) := min
p
{ℓ(p) : U(y, p) = x}
Simple strings like 000...0 can be generated by short programs, and hence have low
Kolmogorov complexity, but irregular (e.g. random) strings are their own shortest
description, and hence have high Kolmogorov complexity. An important property
of K is that it is nearly independent of the choice of U . Furthermore, it shares many
properties with Shannon’s entropy (information measure) S, but K is superior to
S in many respects. To be brief, K is an excellent universal complexity measure,
suitable for quantifying Occam’s razor. There is (only) one severe disadvantage: K
is not finitely computable. The major algorithmic property of K is that it is (only)
co-enumerable, i.e. it is approximable from above.
For general (non-string) objects one can specify some default coding 〈·〉 and
define K(object) :=K(〈object〉), especially for numbers and pairs, e.g. we abbreviate
K(x,y) :=K(〈x,y〉). The most important information-theoretic properties of K are
listed below, where we abbreviate f(x)≤g(x)+O(1) by f(x) +≤g(x). We also later
abbreviate f(x)=O(g(x)) by f(x)
×≤g(x).
Theorem 8 (Information properties of Kolmogorov complexity)
i) K(x)
+≤ ℓ(x)+2log ℓ(x), K(n) +≤ logn+2loglogn
ii)
∑
x2
−K(x) ≤ 1, K(x) ≥ l(x) for ‘most’ x, K(n)→∞ for n→∞.
iii) K(x|y) +≤ K(x) +≤ K(x,y)
iv) K(x,y)
+≤ K(x)+K(y), K(xy) +≤ K(x)+K(y)
v) K(x|y,K(y))+K(y) += K(x,y) += K(y,x) += K(y|x,K(x))+K(x)
vi) K(f(x))
+≤ K(x)+K(f) if f :IB∗→IB∗ is recursive/computable
vii) K(x)
+≤ −log2P (x)+K(P ) if P :IB∗→ [0,1] is recursive and
∑
xP (x)≤1
All (in)equalities remain valid if K is (further) conditioned under some z, i.e.
K(...) ; K(...|z) and K(...|y) ; K(...|y,z). Those stated are all valid within an
additive constant of size O(1), but there are others which are only valid to logarith-
mic accuracy. K has many properties in common with Shannon entropy as it should
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be, since both measure the information content of a string. Property (i) gives an up-
per bound on K, and property (ii) is Kraft’s inequality which implies a lower bound
on K valid for ‘most’ n, where ‘most’ means that there are only o(N) exceptions for
n∈{1,...,N}. Providing side information y can never increase code length, requiring
extra information y can never decrease code length (iii). Coding x and y separately
never helps (iv), and transforming x does not increase its information content (vi).
Property (vi) also shows that if x codes some object o, switching from one coding
scheme to another by means of a recursive bijection leaves K unchanged within
additive O(1) terms. The first nontrivial result is the symmetry of information (v),
which is the analogue of the multiplication/chain rule for conditional probabilities.
Property (vii) is at the heart of the MDL principle [Ris89], which approximates
K(x) by −log2P (x)+K(P ). See [LV97] for proofs.
3.3 Uncertainty & Probabilities
For the objectivist probabilities are real aspects of the world. The outcome of an
observation or an experiment is not deterministic, but involves physical random
processes. Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory formalize the properties that
probabilities should have. In the case of i.i.d. experiments the probabilities assigned
to events can be interpreted as limiting frequencies (frequentist view), but appli-
cations are not limited to this case. Conditionalizing probabilities and Bayes’ rule
are the major tools in computing posterior probabilities from prior ones. For in-
stance, given the initial binary sequence x1...xn−1, what is the probability of the
next bit being 1? The probability of observing xn at time n, given past observations
x1...xn−1 can be computed with the multiplication or chain rule6 if the true gener-
ating distribution µ of the sequences x1x2x3... is known: µ(x<nxn)=µ(x1:n)/µ(x<n)
(see Sections 2.2 and 2.5). The problem, however, is that one often does not know
the true distribution µ (e.g. in the cases of weather and stock-market forecasting).
The subjectivist uses probabilities to characterize an agent’s degree of belief in (or
plausibility of) something, rather than to characterize physical random processes.
This is the most relevant interpretation of probabilities in AI. It is somewhat sur-
prising that plausibilities can be shown to also respect Kolmogorov’s axioms of
probability and the chain rule for conditional probabilities by assuming only a few
plausible qualitative rules they should follow [Cox46]. Hence, if the plausibility of
x1:n is ξ(x1:n), the degree of belief in xn given x<n is, again, given by the conditional
probability: ξ(x<nxn)=ξ(x1:n)/ξ(x<n).
The the chain rule allows determining posterior probabilities/plausibilities from
prior ones, but leaves open the question of how to determine the priors themselves.
In statistical physics, the principle of indifference (symmetry principle) and the max-
imum entropy principle can often be exploited to determine prior probabilities, but
only Occam’s razor is general enough to assign prior probabilities in every situation,
especially to cope with complex domains typical for AI.
6Strictly speaking it is just the definition of conditional probabilities.
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3.4 Algorithmic Probability & Universal Induction
Occam’s razor (appropriately interpreted and in compromise with Epicurus’ princi-
ple of indifference) tells us to assign high/low a priori plausibility to simple/complex
strings x. Using K as the complexity measure, any monotone decreasing function
of K, e.g. ξ(x)= 2−K(x) would satisfy this criterion. But ξ also has to satisfy the
probability axioms, so we have to be a bit more careful. Solomonoff [Sol64, Sol78]
defined the universal prior ξ(x) as the probability that the output of a universal
Turing machine U starts with x when provided with fair coin flips on the input
tape. Formally, ξ can be defined as
ξ(x) :=
∑
p : U(p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p) ≥ 2−K(x) (16)
where the sum is over all (so-called minimal) programs p for which U outputs a
string starting with x. The inequality follows by dropping all terms in
∑
p except
for the shortest p computing x. Strictly speaking ξ is only a semimeasure since it
is not normalized to 1, but this is acceptable/correctable. We derive the following
bound:
∞∑
t=1
(1−ξ(x<txt))2 ≤ −12
∞∑
t=1
ln ξ(x<txt) = −12 ln ξ(x1:∞) ≤ 12 ln 2·K(x1:∞)
In the first inequality we have used (1−a)2≤−1
2
lna for 0≤a≤1. In the equality we
exchanged the sum with the logarithm and eliminated the resulting product by the
chain rule (6). In the last inequality we used (16). If x1:∞ is a computable sequence,
then K(x1:∞) is finite, which implies ξ(x<txt)→ 1 (
∑∞
t=1(1−at)2 <∞⇒ at→ 1).
This means, that if the environment is a computable sequence (whichsoever, e.g.
the digits of π or e in binary representation), after having seen the first few digits, ξ
correctly predicts the next digit with high probability, i.e. it recognizes the structure
of the sequence.
Assume now that the true sequence is drawn from the distribution µ, i.e. the true
(objective) probability of x1:n is µ(x1:n), but µ is unknown. How is the posterior
(subjective) belief ξ(x<nxn)=ξ(xn)/ξ(x<n) related to the true (objective) posterior
probability µ(x<nxn)? Solomonoff’s [Sol78] crucial result is that the posterior (sub-
jective) beliefs converge to the true (objective) posterior probabilities, if the latter
are computable. More precisely, he showed that
∞∑
t=1
∑
x<t
µ(x<t)
(
ξ(x<t0)− µ(x<t0)
)2 +≤ 1
2
ln 2·K(µ), (17)
K(µ) is finite if µ is computable, but the infinite sum on the l.h.s. can only be finite
if the difference ξ(x<t0)−µ(x<t0) tends to zero for t→∞ with µ-probability 1. This
shows that using ξ as an estimate for µ may be a reasonable thing to do.
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3.5 Loss Bounds & Pareto Optimality
Most predictions are eventually used as a basis for some decision or action, which
itself leads to some reward or loss. Let ℓxtyt ∈ [0,1]⊂ IR be the received loss when
performing prediction/decision/action yt ∈ Y and xt ∈ X is the tth symbol of the
sequence. Let yΛt ∈Y be the prediction of a (causal) prediction scheme Λ. The true
probability of the next symbol being xt, given x<t, is µ(x<txt). The expected loss
when predicting yt is E[ℓxtyt]. The total µ-expected loss suffered by the Λ scheme
in the first n predictions is
LΛn :=
n∑
t=1
E[ℓxtyΛt ] =
n∑
t=1
∑
x1:t∈X t
µ(x1:t)ℓxtyΛt (18)
For instance, for the error-loss ℓxy=1 if x=y and 0 else, L
Λ
n is the expected number
of prediction errors, which we denote by EΛn . The goal is to minimize the expected
loss. More generally, we define the Λρ sequence prediction scheme (later also called
SPρ) yΛρt :=argminyt∈Y
∑
xtρ(x<txt)ℓxtyt which minimizes the ρ-expected loss. If µ is
known, Λµ is obviously the best prediction scheme in the sense of achieving minimal
expected loss (LΛµn ≤LΛn for any Λ). One can prove the following loss bound for the
universal Λξ predictor [Hut01b, Hut01a, Hut03a]
0 ≤ LΛξn − LΛµn ≤ 2 ln 2·K(µ) + 2
√
LΛµn ln 2·K(µ) (19)
Together with Ln≤ n this shows that 1nLΛξn − 1nLΛµn =O(n−1/2), i.e. asymptotically
Λξ achieves the optimal average loss of Λµ with rapid convergence. Moreover L
Λξ∞ is
finite if LΛµ∞ is finite and L
Λξ
n /L
Λµ
n →1 if LΛµ∞ is not finite. Bound (19) also implies
LΛn ≥LΛξn −2
√
LΛξn ln2·K(µ), which shows that no (causal) predictor Λ whatsoever
achieves significantly less (expected) loss than Λξ. In view of these results it is fair
to say that, ignoring computational issues, the problem of sequence prediction has
been solved in a universal way.
A different kind of optimality is Pareto optimality. The universal prior ξ is Pareto
optimal in the sense that there is no other predictor that leads to equal or smaller
loss in all environments. Any improvement achieved by some predictor Λ over Λξ in
some environments is balanced by a deterioration in other environments [Hut03c].
4 The Universal Algorithmic Agent AIXI
Active systems, like game playing (SG) and optimization (FM), cannot be reduced
to induction systems. The main idea of this work is to generalize universal induction
to the general agent model described in Section 2. For this, we generalize ξ to include
actions as conditions and replace µ by ξ in the rational agent model, resulting in
the AIξ(=AIXI) model. In this way the problem that the true prior probability µ is
usually unknown is solved. Convergence of ξ→µ can be shown, indicating that the
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AIξ model could behave optimally in any computable but unknown environment
with reinforcement feedback.
The main focus of this section is to investigate what we can expect from a
universally optimal agent and to clarify the meanings of universal, optimal, etc.
Unfortunately bounds similar to the loss bound (19) in the SP case can hold for
no active agent. This forces us to lower our expectation about universally optimal
agents and to introduce other (weaker) performance measures. Finally, we show
that AIξ is Pareto optimal in the sense that there is no other policy yielding higher
or equal value in all environments and a strictly higher value in at least one.
4.1 The Universal AIξ Model
Definition of the AIξ model. We have developed enough formalism to suggest
our universal AIξ model. All we have to do is to suitably generalize the universal
semimeasure ξ from the last section and replace the true but unknown prior prob-
ability µAI in the AIµ model by this generalized ξAI. In what sense this AIξ model
is universal will be discussed subsequently.
In the functional formulation we define the universal probability ξAI of an envi-
ronment q just as 2−ℓ(q)
ξ(q) := 2−ℓ(q)
The definition could not be easier7!8 Collecting the formulas of Section 2.4 and
replacing µ(q) by ξ(q) we get the definition of the AIξ agent in functional form.
Given the history y˙x˙<k the policy p
ξ of the functional AIξ agent is given by
y˙k := argmax
yk
max
p:p(x˙<k)=y˙<kyk
∑
q:q(y˙<k)=x˙<k
2−ℓ(q) · V pqkmk (20)
in cycle k, where V pqkmk is the total reward of cycles k to mk when agent p interacts
with environment q. We have dropped the denominator
∑
qµ(q) from (2) as it is
independent of the p ∈ P˙k and a constant multiplicative factor does not change
argmaxyk .
For the iterative formulation, the universal probability ξ can be obtained by
inserting the functional ξ(q) into (13)
ξ(yx1:k) =
∑
q:q(y1:k)=x1:k
2−ℓ(q) (21)
Replacing µ by ξ in (11) the iterative AIξ agent outputs
y˙k ≡ y˙ξk := argmaxyk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ymk
∑
xmk
(r(xk)+ ...+r(xmk))·ξ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk) (22)
7It is not necessary to use 2−K(q) or something similar as some readers may expect at this point,
because for every program q there exists a functionally equivalent program q˜ with K(q)
+
=ℓ(q˜).
8Here and later we identify objects with their coding relative to some fixed Turing machine
U . For example, if q is a function K(q) :=K(〈q〉) with 〈q〉 being a binary coding of q such that
U(〈q〉,y)=q(y). Reversely, if q already is a binary string we define q(y) :=U(q,y).
Universal Algorithmic Intelligence 23
in cycle k given the history y˙x˙<k.
The equivalence of the functional and iterative AI model (Theorem 5) is true for
every chronological semimeasure ρ, especially for ξ, hence we can talk about the AIξ
model in this respect. It (slightly) depends on the choice of the universal Turing
machine. ℓ(〈q〉) is defined only up to an additive constant. The AIξ model also
depends on the choice of X =R×O and Y , but we do not expect any bias when
the spaces are chosen sufficiently simple, e.g. all strings of length 216. Choosing IN
as the word space would be ideal, but whether the maxima (suprema) exist in this
case, has to be shown beforehand. The only nontrivial dependence is on the horizon
function mk which will be discussed later. So apart from mk and unimportant
details the AIξ agent is uniquely defined by (20) or (22). It does not depend on any
assumption about the environment apart from being generated by some computable
(but unknown!) probability distribution.
Convergence of ξ to µ. Similarly to (17) one can show that the µ-expected
squared difference of µ and ξ is finite for computable µ. This, in turn, shows that
ξ(yx<kyxk) converges rapidly to µ(yx<kyxk) for k→∞ with µ-probability 1. The
line of reasoning is the same; the y are pure spectators. This will change when
we analyze loss/reward bounds analogous to (19). More generally, one can show
[Hut04] that9
ξ(yx<kyxk:mk)
k→∞−→ µ(yx<kyxk:mk) (23)
This gives hope that the outputs y˙k of the AIξ model (22) could converge to the
outputs y˙k from the AIµ model (11).
We want to call an AI model universal, if it is µ-independent (unbiased, model-
free) and is able to solve any solvable problem and learn any learnable task. Further,
we call a universal model, universally optimal, if there is no program, which can solve
or learn significantly faster (in terms of interaction cycles). Indeed, the AIξ model
is parameter free, ξ converges to µ (23), the AIµ model is itself optimal, and we
expect no other model to converge faster to AIµ by analogy to SP (19):
Claim 9 (We expect AIXI to be universally optimal)
This is our main claim. In a sense, the intention of the remaining sections is to
define this statement more rigorously and to give further support.
Intelligence order relation. We define the ξ-expected reward in cycles k to m of
a policy p similar to (2) and (20). We extend the definition to programs p 6∈ P˙k that
are not consistent with the current history.
V pξkm(y˙x˙<k) :=
1
N
∑
q:q(y˙<k)=x˙<k
2−ℓ(q) · V p˜qkm (24)
9Here, and everywhere else, with ξk→µk we mean ξk−µk→0, and not that µk (and ξk) itself
converge to a limiting value.
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The normalization N is again only necessary for interpreting Vkm as the expected
reward but is otherwise unneeded. For consistent policies p∈P˙k we define p˜:=p. For
p 6∈P˙k, p˜ is a modification of p in such a way that its outputs are consistent with the
current history y˙x˙<k, hence p˜∈ P˙k, but unaltered for the current and future cycles
≥k. Using this definition of Vkm we could take the maximium over all policies p in
(20), rather than only the consistent ones.
Definition 10 (Intelligence order relation) We call a policy p more or equally
intelligent than p′ and write
p  p′ :⇔ ∀k∀y˙x˙<k : V pξkmk(y˙x˙<k) ≥ V p
′ξ
kmk
(y˙x˙<k).
i.e. if p yields in any circumstance higher ξ-expected reward than p′.
As the algorithm p∗ behind the AIξ agent maximizes V pξkmk we have p
ξp for all p.
The AIξ model is hence the most intelligent agent w.r.t. . Relation  is a universal
order relation in the sense that it is free of any parameters (except mk) or specific
assumptions about the environment. A proof, that  is a reliable intelligence order
(which we believe to be true), would prove that AIξ is universally optimal. We
could further ask: How useful is  for ordering policies of practical interest with
intermediate intelligence, or how can  help to guide toward constructing more
intelligent systems with reasonable computation time? An effective intelligence order
relation c will be defined in Section 6, which is more useful from a practical point
of view.
4.2 On the Optimality of AIXI
In this section we outline ways toward an optimality proof of AIXI. Sources of
inspiration are the SP loss bounds proven in Section 3 and optimality criteria from
the adaptive control literature (mainly) for linear systems [KV86]. The value bounds
for AIXI are expected to be, in a sense, weaker than the SP loss bounds because the
problem class covered by AIXI is much larger than the class of induction problems.
Convergence of ξ to µ has already been proven, but is not sufficient to establish
convergence of the behavior of the AIXI model to the behavior of the AIµ model.
We will focus on three approaches toward a general optimality proof:
What is meant by universal optimality. The first step is to investigate what we
can expect from AIXI, i.e. what is meant by universal optimality. A “learner” (like
AIXI) may converge to the optimal informed decision-maker (like AIµ) in several
senses. Possibly relevant concepts from statistics are, consistency, self-tunability,
self-optimization, efficiency, unbiasedness, asymptotic or finite convergence [KV86],
Pareto optimality, and some more defined in Section 4.3. Some concepts are stronger
than necessary, others are weaker than desirable but suitable to start with. Self-
optimization is defined as the asymptotic convergence of the average true value
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1
m
V p
ξµ
1m of AIξ to the optimal value
1
m
V ∗µ1m. Apart from convergence speed, self-
optimization of AIXI would most closely correspond to the loss bounds proven for
SP. We investigate which properties are desirable and under which circumstances
the AIXI model satisfies these properties. We will show that no universal model,
including AIXI, can in general be self-optimizing. On the other hand, we show that
AIXI is Pareto optimal in the sense that there is no other policy that performs better
or equal in all environments, and strictly better in at least one.
Limited environmental classes. The problem of defining and proving general
value bounds becomes more feasible by considering, in a first step, restricted con-
cept classes. We analyze AIXI for known classes (like Markovian or factorizable
environments) and especially for the new classes (forgetful, relevant, asymptotically
learnable, farsighted, uniform, pseudo-passive, and passive) defined later in Sec-
tion 4.3. In Section 5 we study the behavior of AIXI in various standard problem
classes, including sequence prediction, strategic games, function minimization, and
supervised learning.
Generalization of AIXI to general Bayes mixtures. The other approach is
to generalize AIXI to AIζ , where ζ() =
∑
ν∈Mwνν() is a general Bayes mixture of
distributions ν in some class M. If M is the multi-set of enumerable semimea-
sures enumerated by a Turing machine, then AIζ coincides with AIXI. If M is the
(multi)set of passive effective environments, then AIXI reduces to the Λξ predictor
that has been shown to perform well. One can show that these loss/value bounds
generalize to wider classes, at least asymptotically [Hut02b]. Promising classes are,
again, the ones described in Section 4.3. In particular, for ergodic mdps we showed
that AIζ is self-optimizing. Obviously, the least we must demand from M to have
a chance of finding a self-optimizing policy is that there exists some self-optimizing
policy at all. The key result in [Hut02b] is that this necessary condition is also suf-
ficient. More generally, the key is not to prove absolute results for specific problem
classes, but to prove relative results of the form “if there exists a policy with certain
desirable properties, then AIζ also possesses these desirable properties”. If there
are tasks that cannot be solved by any policy, AIζ cannot be blamed for failing.
Environmental classes that allow for self-optimizing policies include bandits, i.i.d.
processes, classification tasks, certain classes of pomdps, kth-order ergodic mdps,
factorizable environments, repeated games, and prediction problems. Note that in
this approach we have for each environmental class a corresponding model AIζ ,
whereas in the approach pursued in this article the same universal AIXI model is
analyzed for all environmental classes.
Optimality by construction. A possible further approach toward an optimality
“proof” is to regard AIXI as optimal by construction. This perspective is common
in various (simpler) settings. For instance, in bandit problems, where pulling arm i
leads to reward 1 (0) with unknown probability pi (1−pi), the traditional Bayesian
solution to the uncertainty about pi is to assume a uniform (or Beta) prior over
pi and to maximize the (subjectively) expected reward sum over multiple trials.
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The exact solution (in terms of Gittins indices) is widely regarded as “optimal”,
although justified alternative approaches exist. Similarly, but simpler, assuming
a uniform subjective prior over the Bernoulli parameter p(i) ∈ [0,1], one arrives at
the reasonable, but more controversial, Laplace rule for predicting i.i.d. sequences.
AIXI is similar in the sense that the unknown µ∈M is the analogue of the unknown
p∈[0,1], and the prior beliefs wν=2−K(ν) justified by Occam’s razor are the analogue
of a uniform distribution over [0,1]. In the same sense as Gittins’ solution to the
bandit problem and Laplace’ rule for Bernoulli sequences, AIXI may also be regarded
as optimal by construction. Theorems relating AIXI to AIµ would not be regarded
as optimality proofs of AIXI, but just as how much harder it becomes to operate
when µ is unknown, i.e. the achievements of the first three approaches are simply
reinterpreted.
4.3 Value Bounds and Separability Concepts
Introduction. The values Vkm associated with the AI systems correspond roughly
to the negative loss −LΛn of the SP systems. In SP, we were interested in small
bounds for the loss excess LΛξn −LΛn . Unfortunately, simple value bounds for AIξ in
terms of Vkm analogous to the loss bound (19) do not hold. We even have difficulties
in specifying what we can expect to hold for AIξ or any AI system that claims to
be universally optimal. Consequently, we cannot have a proof if we don’t know
what to prove. In SP, the only important property of µ for proving loss bounds
was its complexity K(µ). We will see that in the AI case, there are no useful
bounds in terms of K(µ) only. We either have to study restricted problem classes or
consider bounds depending on other properties of µ, rather than on its complexity
only. In the following, we will exhibit the difficulties by two examples and introduce
concepts that may be useful for proving value bounds. Despite the difficulties in even
claiming useful value bounds, we nevertheless, firmly believe that the order relation
(Definition 10) correctly formalizes the intuitive meaning of intelligence and, hence,
that the AIξ agent is universally optimal.
(Pseudo) Passive µ and the HeavenHell example. In the following we choose
mk=m. We want to compare the true, i.e. µ-expected value V
µ
1m of a µ-independent
universal policy pbest with any other policy p. Naively, we might expect the existence
of a policy pbest that maximizes V µ1m, apart from additive corrections of lower order
for m→∞
V p
bestµ
1m ≥ V pµ1m − o(...) ∀µ, p (25)
Such policies are sometimes called self-optimizing [KV86]. Note that V p
µµ
1m ≥V pµ1m ∀p,
but pµ is not a candidate for (a universal) pbest as it depends on µ. On the other hand,
the policy pξ of the AIξ agent maximizes V ξ1m by definition (p
ξp). As V ξ1m is thought
to be a guess of V µ1m, we might expect p
best=pξ to approximately maximize V µ1m, i.e.
(25) to hold. Let us consider the problem class (set of environments) M={µ0,µ1}
with Y=R={0,1} and rk=δiy1 in environment µi, where the Kronecker symbol δxy
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is defined as 1 for x=y and 0 otherwise. The first action y1 decides whether you go
to heaven with all future rewards rk being 1 (good) or to hell with all future rewards
being 0 (bad). Note that µi are (deterministic, non-ergodic) mdps:
µi =



Hell

?
y=∗
r=0
ffy=1−i
r=0



Start
-y= i
r=1



Heaven

?
y=∗
r=1
It is clear that if µi, i.e. i is known, the optimal policy p
µi is to output y1= i in the
first cycle with V p
µiµ
1m =m. On the other hand, any unbiased policy p
best independent
of the actual µ either outputs y1 = 1 or y1= 0. Independent of the actual choice
y1, there is always an environment (µ=µ1−y1) for which this choice is catastrophic
(V p
bestµ
1m =0). No single agent can perform well in both environments µ0 and µ1. The
r.h.s. of (25) equals m−o(m) for p=pµ. For all pbest there is a µ for which the l.h.s.
is zero. We have shown that no pbest can satisfy (25) for all µ and p, so we cannot
expect pξ to do so. Nevertheless, there are problem classes for which (25) holds, for
instance SP. For SP, (25) is just a reformulation of (19) with an appropriate choice
for pbest, namely Λξ (which differs from p
ξ, see next section). We expect (25) to
hold for all inductive problems in which the environment is not influenced10 by the
output of the agent. We want to call these µ, passive or inductive environments.
Further, we want to callM and µ∈M satisfying (25) with pbest=pξ pseudo-passive.
So we expect inductive µ to be pseudo-passive.
The OnlyOne example. Let us give a further example to demonstrate the dif-
ficulties in establishing value bounds. Let X =R= {0,1} and |Y| be large. We
consider all (deterministic) environments in which a single complex output y∗ is
correct (r=1) and all others are wrong (r=0). The problem class M is defined by
M := {µy∗ : y∗∈Y , K(y∗) =⌊log |Y|⌋}, where µy∗(yx<kyk1) := δyky∗ ∀k.
There are N
×
= |Y| such y∗. The only way a µ-independent policy p can find the
correct y∗, is by trying one y after the other in a certain order. In the first N−1
cycles, at most N−1 different y are tested. As there are N different possible y∗,
there is always a µ∈M for which p gives erroneous outputs in the first N−1 cycles.
The number of errors is Ep∞≥N−1 ×= |Y| ×=2K(y∗) ×=2K(µ) for this µ. As this is true
for any p, it is also true for the AIξ model, hence Ep
ξ
k ≤ 2K(µ) is the best possible
error bound we can expect that depends on K(µ) only. Actually, we will derive such
a bound in Section 5.1 for inductive environments. Unfortunately, as we are mainly
interested in the cycle region k≪|Y| ×=2K(µ) (see Section 2.8) this bound is vacuous.
There are no interesting bounds for deterministic µ depending on K(µ) only, unlike
the SP case. Bounds must either depend on additional properties of µ or we have to
10Of course, the reward feedback rk depends on the agent’s output. What we have in mind is,
like in sequence prediction, that the true sequence is not influenced by the agent.
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consider specialized bounds for restricted problem classes. The case of probabilistic
µ is similar. Whereas for SP there are useful bounds in terms of LΛµk and K(µ),
there are no such bounds for AIξ. Again, this is not a drawback of AIξ since for no
unbiased AI system could the errors/rewards be bound in terms of K(µ) and the
errors/rewards of AIµ only.
There is a way to make use of gross (e.g. 2K(µ)) bounds. Assume that after
a reasonable number of cycles k, the information x˙<k perceived by the AIξ agent
contains a lot of information about the true environment µ. The information in
x˙<k might be coded in any form. Let us assume that the complexity K(µ|x˙<k) of µ
under the condition that x˙<k is known, is of order 1. Consider a theorem, bounding
the sum of rewards or of other quantities over cycles 1...∞ in terms of f(K(µ)) for a
function f with f(O(1))=O(1), like f(n)=2n. Then, there will be a bound for cycles
k...∞ in terms of ≈f(K(µ|x˙<k))=O(1). Hence, a bound like 2K(µ) can be replaced
by small bound ≈2K(µ|x˙<k)=O(1) after k cycles. All one has to show/ensure/assume
is that enough information about µ is presented (in any form) in the first k cycles.
In this way, even a gross bound could become useful. In Section 5.4 we use a similar
argument to prove that AIξ is able to learn supervised.
Asymptotic learnability. In the following, we weaken (25) in the hope of getting
a bound applicable to wider problem classes than the passive one. Consider the
I/O sequence y˙1x˙1...y˙nx˙n caused by AIξ. On history y˙x˙<k, AIξ will output y˙k≡ y˙ξk
in cycle k. Let us compare this to y˙µk what AIµ would output, still on the same
history y˙x˙<k produced by AIξ. As AIµ maximizes the µ-expected value, AIξ causes
lower (or at best equal) V µkmk if y˙
ξ
k differs from y˙
µ
k . Let Dnµξ :=E[
∑n
k=11−δy˙µ
k
,y˙ξ
k
]
be the µ-expected number of suboptimal choices of AIξ, i.e. outputs different from
AIµ in the first n cycles. One might weigh the deviating cases by their severity.
In particular, when the µ-expected rewards V pµkmk for y˙
ξ
k and y˙
µ
k are equal or close
to each other, this should be taken into account in a definition of Dnµξ, e.g. by a
weight factor [V ∗µkm(yx<k)−V p
ξµ
km (yx<k)]. These details do not matter in the following
qualitative discussion. The important difference to (25) is that here we stick to the
history produced by AIξ and count a wrong decision as, at most, one error. The
wrong decision in the HeavenHell example in the first cycle no longer counts as
losing m rewards, but counts as one wrong decision. In a sense, this is fairer. One
shouldn’t blame somebody too much who makes a single wrong decision for which
he just has too little information available, in order to make a correct decision. The
AIξ model would deserve to be called asymptotically optimal if the probability of
making a wrong decision tends to zero, i.e. if
Dnµξ/n→ 0 for n→∞, i.e. Dnµξ = o(n). (26)
We say that µ can be asymptotically learned (by AIξ) if (26) is satisfied. We claim
that AIξ (for mk→∞) can asymptotically learn every problem µ of relevance, i.e.
AIξ is asymptotically optimal. We included the qualifier of relevance, as we are
not sure whether there could be strange µ spoiling (26) but we expect those µ to
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be irrelevant from the perspective of AI. In the field of Learning, there are many
asymptotic learnability theorems, often not too difficult to prove. So a proof of (26)
might also be feasible. Unfortunately, asymptotic learnability theorems are often
too weak to be useful from a practical point of view. Nevertheless, they point in the
right direction.
Uniform µ. From the convergence (23) of ξ→µ we might expect V pξkmk→V pµkmk for
all p, and hence we might also expect y˙ξk defined in (22) to converge to y˙
µ
k defined
in (11) for k→∞. The first problem is that if the Vkmk for the different choices of
yk are nearly equal, then even if V
pξ
kmk
≈ V pµkmk , y˙ξk 6= y˙µk is possible due to the non-
continuity of argmaxyk . This can be cured by a weighted Dnµξ as described above.
More serious is the second problem we explain for hk=1 and X =R= {0,1}. For
y˙ξk≡argmaxykξ(y˙r˙<kyk1) to converge to y˙µk ≡argmaxykµ(y˙r˙<kyk1), it is not sufficient
to know that ξ(y˙r˙<ky˙r˙k)→µ(y˙r˙<ky˙r˙k) as proven in (23). We need convergence not
only for the true output y˙k, but also for alternative outputs yk. y˙
ξ
k converges to y˙
µ
k
if ξ converges uniformly to µ, i.e. if in addition to (23)
|µ(yx<ky′kx′k)− ξ(yx<ky′kx′k)| < c·|µ(yx<kyxk)− ξ(yx<kyxk)| ∀y′kx′k (27)
holds for some constant c (at least in a µ-expected sense). We call µ satisfying (27)
uniform. For uniform µ one can show (26) with appropriately weighted Dnµξ and
bounded horizon hk<hmax. Unfortunately there are relevant µ that are not uniform.
Other concepts. In the following, we briefly mention some further concepts.
A Markovian µ is defined as depending only on the last cycle, i.e. µ(yx<kyxk) =
µk(xk−1yxk). We say µ is generalized (l
th-order) Markovian, if µ(yx<kyxk) =
µk(xk−lyxk−l+1:k−1yxk) for fixed l. This property has some similarities to factor-
izable µ defined in (14). If further µk≡µ1∀k, µ is called stationary. Further, we call
µ (ξ) forgetful if µ(yx<kyxk) (ξ(yx<kyxk)) become(s) independent of yx<l for fixed l
and k→∞ with µ-probability 1. Further, we say µ is farsighted if limmk→∞y˙(mk)k
exists. More details will be given in Section 4.5, where we also give an example of
a farsighted µ for which nevertheless the limit mk→∞ makes no sense.
Summary. We have introduced several concepts that might be useful for proving
value bounds, including forgetful, relevant, asymptotically learnable, farsighted, uni-
form, (generalized) Markovian, factorizable and (pseudo)passive µ. We have sorted
them here, approximately in the order of decreasing generality. We will call them
separability concepts. The more general (like relevant, asymptotically learnable and
farsighted) µ will be called weakly separable, the more restrictive (like (pseudo)
passive and factorizable) µ will be called strongly separable, but we will use these
qualifiers in a more qualitative, rather than rigid sense. Other (non-separability)
concepts are deterministic µ and, of course, the class of all chronological µ.
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4.4 Pareto Optimality of AIξ
This subsection shows Pareto-opimtality of AIξ analogous to SP. The total µ-
expected reward V p
ξ
µ of policy p
ξ of the AIξ model is of central interest in judging the
performance of AIξ. We know that there are policies (e.g. pµ of AIµ) with higher
µ-value (V ∗µ ≥ V pξµ ). In general, every policy based on an estimate ρ of µ that is
closer to µ than ξ is, outperforms pξ in environment µ, simply because it is more
tailored toward µ. On the other hand, such a system probably performs worse than
pξ in other environments. Since we do not know µ in advance we may ask whether
there exists a policy p with better or equal performance than pξ in all environments
ν∈M and a strictly better performance for one ν∈M. This would clearly render
pξ suboptimal. One can show that there is no such p [Hut02b]
Definition 11 (Pareto Optimality) A policy p˜ is called Pareto optimal if there
is no other policy p with V pν ≥V p˜ν for all ν∈M and strict inequality for at least one
ν.
Theorem 12 (Pareto Optimality) AIξ alias pξ is Pareto optimal.
Pareto optimality should be regarded as a necessary condition for an agent aiming
to be optimal. From a practical point of view, a significant increase of V for many
environments ν may be desirable, even if this causes a small decrease of V for a few
other ν. The impossibility of such a “balanced” improvement is a more demanding
condition on pξ than pure Pareto optimality. In [Hut02b] it has been shown that
AIξ is also balanced Pareto optimal.
4.5 The Choice of the Horizon
The only significant arbitrariness in the AIξ model lies in the choice of the horizon
function hk≡mk−k+1. We discuss some choices that seem to be natural and give
preliminary conclusions at the end. We will not discuss ad hoc choices of hk for
specific problems (like the discussion in Section 5.2 in the context of finite strategic
games). We are interested in universal choices of mk.
Fixed horizon. If the lifetime of the agent is known to be m, which is in practice
always large but finite, then the choice mk =m maximizes correctly the expected
future reward. Lifetime m is usually not known in advance, as in many cases the
time we are willing to run an agent depends on the quality of its outputs. For this
reason, it is often desirable that good outputs are not delayed too much, if this
results in a marginal reward increase only. This can be incorporated by damping
the future rewards. If, for instance, the probability of survival in a cycle is γ < 1,
an exponential damping (geometric discount) rk := r
′
k ·γk is appropriate, where r′k
are bounded, e.g. r′k ∈ [0,1]. Expression (22) converges for mk→∞ in this case.11
11More precisely, y˙k=argmax
yk
lim
mk→∞
V
∗ξ
kmk
(y˙x˙<kyk) exists.
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But this does not solve the problem, as we introduced a new arbitrary time scale
(1−γ)−1. Every damping introduces a time scale. Taking γ→1 is prone to the same
problems as mk→∞ in the undiscounted case discussed below.
Dynamic horizon (universal & harmonic discounting). The largest horizon
with guaranteed finite and enumerable reward sum can be obtained by the universal
discount rk;rk·2−K(k). This discount results in truly farsighted agent with effective
horizon that grows faster than any computable function. It is similar to a near-
harmonic discount rk ; rk ·k−(1+ε), since 2−K(k) ≤ 1/k for most k and 2−K(k) ≥
c/(k log2k). More generally, the time-scale invariant damping factor rk = r
′
k ·k−α
introduces a dynamic time scale. In cycle k the contribution of cycle 21/α ·k is
damped by a factor 1
2
. The effective horizon hk in this case is∼k. The choice hk=β·k
with β∼21/α qualitatively models the same behavior. We have not introduced an
arbitrary time scale m, but limited the farsightedness to some multiple (or fraction)
of the length of the current history. This avoids the preselection of a global time
scale m or 1
1−γ . This choice has some appeal, as it seems that humans of age
k years usually do not plan their lives for more than, perhaps, the next k years
(βhuman≈1). From a practical point of view this model might serve all needs, but
from a theoretical point we feel uncomfortable with such a limitation in the horizon
from the very beginning. Note that we have to choose β=O(1) because otherwise we
would again introduce a number β, which has to be justified. We favor the universal
discount γk=2
−K(k), since it allows us, if desired, to “mimic” all other more greedy
behaviors based on other discounts γk by choosing rk∈ [0,c·γk]⊆ [0,2−K(k)].
Infinite horizon. The naive limit mk→∞ in (22) may turn out to be well de-
fined and the previous discussion superfluous. In the following, we suggest a limit
that is always well defined (for finite Y). Let y˙(mk)k be defined as in (22) with de-
pendence on mk made explicit. Further, let Y˙ (m)k := { y˙(mk)k :mk≥m} be the set of
outputs in cycle k for the choices mk=m,m+1,m+2,.... Because Y˙ (m)k ⊇Y˙ (m+1)k 6={},
we have Y˙ (∞)k :=
⋂∞
m=kY˙ (m)k 6= {}. We define the mk =∞ model to output any
y˙
(∞)
k ∈ Y˙ (∞)k . This is the best output consistent with some arbitrary large choice
of mk. Choosing the lexicographically smallest y˙
(∞)
k ∈Y˙ (∞)k would correspond to the
lower limit limm→∞y˙
(m)
k , which always exists (for finite Y). Generally y˙(∞)k ∈ Y˙ (∞)k
is unique, i.e. |Y˙ (∞)k |=1 iff the naive limit limm→∞y˙(m)k exists. Note that the limit
limm→∞V ∗km(yx<k) need not exist for this construction.
Average reward and differential gain. Taking the raw average reward (rk+...+
rm)/(m−k+1) and m→∞ also does not help: consider an arbitrary policy for the
first k cycles and the/an optimal policy for the remaining cycles k+1...∞. In e.g.
i.i.d. environments the limit exists, but all these policies give the same average value,
since changing a finite number of terms does not affect an infinite average. In mdp
environments with a single recurrent class one can define the relative or differential
gain [BT96]. In more general environments (we are interested in) the differential
gain can be infinite, which is acceptable, since differential gains can still be totally
32 Marcus Hutter, Technical Report, IDSIA-01-03
ordered. The major problem is the existence of the differential gain, i.e. whether it
converges for m→∞ in IR∪{∞} at all (and does not oscillate). This is just the old
convergence problem in slightly different form.
Immortal agents are lazy. The construction in the next to previous paragraph
leads to a mathematically elegant, no-parameter AIξ model. Unfortunately this is
not the end of the story. The limit mk→∞ can cause undesirable results in the
AIµ model for special µ, which might also happen in the AIξ model whatever we
define mk→∞. Consider an agent who for every
√
l consecutive days of work, can
thereafter take l days of holiday. Formally, consider Y=X=R={0,1}. Output yk=0
shall give reward rk =0 and output yk=1 shall give rk=1 iff y˙k−l−
√
l...y˙k−l=0...0
for some l, i.e. the agent can achieve l consecutive positive rewards if there was a
preceding sequence of length at least
√
l with yk=rk=0. If the lifetime of the AIµ
agent is m, it outputs y˙k=0 in the first s cycles and then y˙k=1 for the remaining
s2 cycles with s such that s+s2=m. This will lead to the highest possible total
reward V1m=s
2=m+ 1
2
−
√
m+1/4. Any fragmentation of the 0 and 1 sequences would
reduce V1m, e.g. alternatingly working for 2 days and taking 4 days off would give
V1m=
2
3
m. For m→∞ the AIµ agent can and will delay the point s of switching
to y˙k=1 indefinitely and always output 0 leading to total reward 0, obviously the
worst possible behavior. The AIξ agent will explore the above rule after a while
of trying yk=0/1 and then applies the same behavior as the AIµ agent, since the
simplest rules covering past data dominate ξ. For finite m this is exactly what we
want, but for infinite m the AIξ model (probably) fails, just as the AIµ model does.
The good point is that this is not a weakness of the AIξ model in particular, as AIµ
fails too. The bad point is that mk→∞ has far-reaching consequences, even when
starting from an already very large mk=m. This is because the µ of this example is
highly nonlocal in time, i.e. it may violate one of our weak separability conditions.
Conclusions. We are not sure whether the choice of mk is of marginal importance,
as long asmk is chosen sufficiently large and of low complexity, mk=2
216 for instance,
or whether the choice of mk will turn out to be a central topic for the AIξ model
or for the planning aspect of any AI system in general. We suppose that the limit
mk→∞ for the AIξ model results in correct behavior for weakly separable µ. A
proof of this conjecture, if true, would probably give interesting insights.
4.6 Outlook
Expert advice approach. We considered expected performance bounds for pre-
dictions based on Solomonoff’s prior. The other, dual, currently very popular ap-
proach, is “prediction with expert advice” (PEA) invented by Littlestone and War-
muth (1989), and Vovk (1992). Whereas PEA performs well in any environment,
but only relative to a given set of experts , our Λξ predictor competes with any
other predictor, but only in expectation for environments with computable distribu-
tion. It seems philosophically less compromising to make assumptions on prediction
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strategies than on the environment, however weak. One could investigate whether
PEA can be generalized to the case of active agents, which would result in a model
dual to AIXI. We believe the answer to be negative, which on the positive side would
show the necessity of Occam’s razor assumption, and the distinguishedness of AIXI.
Actions as random variables. The uniqueness for the choice of the generalized
ξ (16) in the AIXI model could be explored. From the originally many alternatives,
which could all be ruled out, there is one alternative which still seems possible.
Instead of defining ξ as in (21) one could treat the agent’s actions y also as universally
distributed random variables and then conditionalize ξ on y by the chain rule.
Structure of AIXI. The algebraic properties and the structure of AIXI could be
investigated in more depth. This would extract the essentials from AIXI which
finally could lead to an axiomatic characterization of AIXI. The benefit is as in
any axiomatic approach. It would clearly exhibit the assumptions, separate the
essentials from technicalities, simplify understanding and, most important, guide in
finding proofs.
Restricted policy classes. The development in this section could be scaled down
to restricted classes of policies P. One may define V ∗=argmaxp∈PV p. For instance,
consider a finite class of quickly computable policies. For mdps, ξ is quickly com-
putable and V pξ can be (efficiently) computed by Monte Carlo sampling. Maximizing
over the finitely many policies p∈P selects the asymptotically best policy pξ from
P for all (ergodic) mdps [Hut02b].
4.7 Conclusions
All tasks that require intelligence to be solved can naturally be formulated as a
maximization of some expected utility in the framework of agents. We gave an
explicit expression (11) of such a decision-theoretic agent. The main remaining
problem is the unknown prior probability distribution µAI of the environment(s).
Conventional learning algorithms are unsuitable, because they can neither handle
large (unstructured) state spaces nor do they converge in the theoretically minimal
number of cycles nor can they handle non-stationary environments appropriately.
On the other hand, the universal semimeasure ξ (16), based on ideas from algo-
rithmic information theory, solves the problem of the unknown prior distribution
for induction problems. No explicit learning procedure is necessary, as ξ automat-
ically converges to µ. We unified the theory of universal sequence prediction with
the decision-theoretic agent by replacing the unknown true prior µAI by an appro-
priately generalized universal semimeasure ξAI. We gave strong arguments that
the resulting AIξ model is universally optimal. Furthermore, possible solutions to
the horizon problem were discussed. In Section 5 we present a number of problem
classes, and outline how the AIξ model can solve them. They include sequence pre-
diction, strategic games, function minimization and, especially, how AIξ learns to
learn supervised. In Section 6 we develop a modified time-bounded (computable)
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AIXItl version.
5 Important Problem Classes
In order to give further support for the universality and optimality of the AIξ theory,
we apply AIξ in this section to a number of problem classes. They include sequence
prediction, strategic games, function minimization and, especially, how AIξ learns
to learn supervised. For some classes we give concrete examples to illuminate the
scope of the problem class. We first formulate each problem class in its natural way
(when µproblem is known) and then construct a formulation within the AIµ model and
prove its equivalence. We then consider the consequences of replacing µ by ξ. The
main goal is to understand why and how the problems are solved by AIξ. We only
highlight special aspects of each problem class. Sections 5.1–5.5 together should give
a better picture of the AIξ model. We do not study every aspect for every problem
class. The subsections may be read selectively, and are not essential to understand
the remainder.
5.1 Sequence Prediction (SP)
We introduced the AIξ model as a unification of ideas of sequential decision theory
and universal probability distribution. We might expect AIξ to behave identically
to SPξ, when faced with a sequence prediction problem, but things are not that
simple, as we will see.
Using the AIµ model for sequence prediction. We saw in Section 3 how to
predict sequences for known and unknown prior distribution µSP. Here we consider
binary sequences12 z1z2z3...∈IB∞ with known prior probability µSP(z1z2z3...).
We want to show how the AIµ model can be used for sequence prediction. We
will see that it makes the same prediction as the SPµ agent. For simplicity we only
discuss the special error loss ℓxy=1−δxy, where δ is the Kronecker symbol, defined
as δab=1 for a= b and 0 otherwise. First, we have to specify how the AIµ model
should be used for sequence prediction. The following choice is natural:
The system’s output yk is interpreted as a prediction for the k
th bit zk of the
string under consideration. This means that yk is binary (yk∈IB=:Y). As a reaction
of the environment, the agent receives reward rk =1 if the prediction was correct
(yk= zk), or rk=0 if the prediction was erroneous (yk 6= zk). The question is what
the observation ok in the next cycle should be. One choice would be to inform the
agent about the correct kth bit of the string and set ok=zk. But as from the reward
rk in conjunction with the prediction yk, the true bit zk=δykrk can be inferred, this
information is redundant. There is no need for this additional feedback. So we set
ok= ǫ∈O={ǫ}, thus having xk≡rk∈R≡X ={0,1}. The agent’s performance does
12We use zk to avoid notational conflicts with the agent’s inputs xk.
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not change when we include this redundant information; it merely complicates the
notation. The prior probability µAI of the AIµ model is
µAI(y1x1...ykxk) = µ
AI(y1r1...ykrk) = µ
SP(δy1r1 ...δykrk) = µ
SP(z1...zk) (28)
In the following, we will drop the superscripts of µ because they are clear from the
arguments of µ and the µ equal in any case. It is intuitively clear and can formally
be shown [Hut00, Hut04] that maximizing the future reward V µkm is identical to
greedily maximizing the immediate expected reward V µkk. There is no exploration-
exploitation tradeoff in the prediction case. Hence, AIµ acts with
y˙k = argmax
yk
V ∗µkk (y˙x˙<kyk) = argmaxyk
∑
rk
rk·µAI(y˙r˙<kyrk) = argmaxzk µ
SP(z˙1...z˙k−1zk)
(29)
The first equation is the definition of the agent’s action (10) with mk replaced by
k. In the second equation we used the definition (9) of Vkm. In the last equation we
used (28) and rk=δykzk .
So, the AIµ model predicts that zk that has maximal µ-probability, given
z˙1...z˙k−1. This prediction is independent of the choice of mk. It is exactly the
prediction scheme of the sequence predictor SPµ with known prior described in Sec-
tion 3.5 (with special error loss). As this model was optimal, AIµ is optimal too, i.e.
has minimal number of expected errors (maximal µ-expected reward) as compared
to any other sequence prediction scheme. From this, it is clear that the value V ∗µkm
must be closely related to the expected error EΛµm (18). Indeed one can show that
V ∗µ1m=m−EΛµm , and similarly for general loss functions.
Using the AIξ model for sequence prediction. Now we want to use the uni-
versal AIξ model instead of AIµ for sequence prediction and try to derive error/loss
bounds analogous to (19). Like in the AIµ case, the agent’s output yk in cycle k
is interpreted as a prediction for the kth bit zk of the string under consideration.
The reward is rk = δykzk and there are no other inputs ok = ǫ. What makes the
analysis more difficult is that ξ is not symmetric in yiri↔ (1−yi)(1−ri) and (28)
does not hold for ξ. On the other hand, ξAI converges to µAI in the limit (23), and
(28) should hold asymptotically for ξ in some sense. So we expect that everything
proven for AIµ holds approximately for AIξ. The AIξ model should behave similarly
to Solomonoff prediction SPξ. In particular, we expect error bounds similar to (19).
Making this rigorous seems difficult. Some general remarks have been made in the
last section. Note that bounds like (25) cannot hold in general, but could be valid
for AIξ in (pseudo)passive environments.
Here we concentrate on the special case of a deterministic computable environ-
ment, i.e. the environment is a sequence z˙= z˙1z˙2... with K(z˙1:∞)<∞. Furthermore,
we only consider the simplest horizon model mk = k, i.e. greedily maximize only
the next reward. This is sufficient for sequence prediction, as the reward of cycle
k only depends on output yk and not on earlier decisions. This choice is in no way
sufficient and satisfactory for the full AIξ model, as one single choice of mk should
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serve for all AI problem classes. So AIξ should allow good sequence prediction for
some universal choice ofmk and not only formk=k, which definitely does not suffice
for more complicated AI problems. The analysis of this general case is a challenge
for the future. For mk=k the AIξ model (22) with oi=ǫ and rk∈{0,1} reduces to
y˙k = argmax
yk
∑
rk
rk ·ξ(y˙r˙<kyrk) = argmaxyk ξ(y˙r˙<kyk1) (30)
The environmental response r˙k is given by δy˙k z˙k ; it is 1 for a correct prediction
(y˙k= z˙k) and 0 otherwise. One can show [Hut00, Hut04] that the number of wrong
predictions EAIξ∞ of the AIξ model (30) in these environments is bounded by
EAIξ∞
×≤ 2K(z˙1:∞) < ∞ (31)
for a computable deterministic environment string z˙1z˙2.... The intuitive interpre-
tation is that each wrong prediction eliminates at least one program p of size
ℓ(p)
+≤K(z˙). The size is smaller than K(z˙), as larger policies could not mislead
the agent to a wrong prediction, since there is a program of size K(z˙) making a
correct prediction. There are at most 2K(z˙)+O(1) such policies, which bounds the
total number of errors.
We have derived a finite bound for EAIξ∞ , but unfortunately, a rather weak one
as compared to (19). The reason for the strong bound in the SP case was that every
error eliminates half of the programs.
The AIξ model would not be sufficient for realistic applications if the bound (31)
were sharp, but we have the strong feeling (but only weak arguments) that better
bounds proportional to K(z˙) analogous to (19) exist. The current proof technique is
not strong enough for achieving this. One argument for a better bound is the formal
similarity between argmaxzkξ(z˙<kzk) and (30), the other is that we were unable to
construct an example sequence for which AIξ makes more than O(K(z˙)) errors.
5.2 Strategic Games (SG)
Introduction. A very important class of problems are strategic games (SG). Game
theory considers simple games of chance like roulette, combined with strategy like
backgammon, up to purely strategic games like chess or checkers or go. In fact,
what is subsumed under game theory is so general that it includes not only a huge
variety of game types, but can also describe political and economic competitions
and coalitions, Darwinism and many more topics. It seems that nearly every AI
problem could be brought into the form of a game. Nevertheless, the intention of a
game is that several players perform actions with (partial) observable consequences.
The goal of each player is to maximize some utility function (e.g. to win the game).
The players are assumed to be rational, taking into account all information they
posses. The different goals of the players are usually in conflict. For an introduction
into game theory, see [FT91, OR94, RN03, NM44].
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If we interpret the AI system as one player and the environment models the other
rational player and the environment provides the reinforcement feedback rk, we see
that the agent-environment configuration satisfies all criteria of a game. On the
other hand, the AI models can handle more general situations, since they interact
optimally with an environment, even if the environment is not a rational player with
conflicting goals.
Strictly competitive strategic games. In the following, we restrict ourselves to
deterministic, strictly competitive strategic13 games with alternating moves. Player
1 makes move yk in round k, followed by the move ok of player 2.
14 So a game with n
rounds consists of a sequence of alternating moves y1o1y2o2...ynon. At the end of the
game in cycle n the game or final board situation is evaluated with V (y1o1...ynon).
Player 1 tries to maximize V , whereas player 2 tries to minimize V . In the simplest
case, V is 1 if player 1 won the game, V =−1 if player 2 won and V =0 for a draw.
We assume a fixed game length n independent of the actual move sequence. For
games with variable length but maximal possible number of moves n, we could add
dummy moves and pad the length to n. The optimal strategy (Nash equilibrium)
of both players is a minimax strategy
o˙k = argmin
ok
max
yk+1
min
ok+1
...max
yn
min
on
V (y˙1o˙1...y˙kok...ynon), (32)
y˙k = argmax
yk
min
ok
...max
yn
min
on
V (y˙1o˙1...y˙k−1o˙k−1ykok...ynon). (33)
But note that the minimax strategy is only optimal if both players behave rationally.
If, for instance, player 2 has limited capabilites or makes errors and player 1 is able to
discover these (through past moves), he could exploit these weaknesses and improve
his performance by deviating from the minimax strategy. At least the classical game
theory of Nash equilibria does not take into account limited rationality, whereas the
AIξ agent should.
Using the AIµ model for game playing. In the following, we demonstrate the
applicability of the AI model to games. The AIµ model takes the position of player
1. The environment provides the evaluation V . For a symmetric situation we could
take a second AIµ model as player 2, but for simplicity we take the environment
as the second player and assume that this environmental player behaves according
to the minimax strategy (32). The environment serves as a perfect player and as a
teacher, albeit a very crude one, as it tells the agent at the end of the game only
whether it won or lost.
The minimax behavior of player 2 can be expressed by a (deterministic) proba-
13In game theory, games like chess are often called ‘extensive’, whereas ‘strategic’ is reserved for
a different kind of game.
14We anticipate notationally the later identification of the moves of player 1/2 with the ac-
tions/observations in the AI models.
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bility distribution µSG as the following:
µSG(y1o1...ynon) :=
 1 if ok = argmino′k ...maxy′n mino′n V (y1o1...yko
′
k...y
′
no
′
n) ∀ k
0 otherwise
(34)
The probability that player 2 makes move ok is µ
SG(y˙1o˙1...y˙kok), which is 1 for ok= o˙k
as defined in (32) and 0 otherwise.
Clearly, the AIµ system receives no feedback, i.e. r1 = ...= rn−1 = 0, until the
end of the game, where it should receive positive/negative/neutral feedback on a
win/loss/draw, i.e. rn=V (...). The environmental prior probability is therefore
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
{
µSG(y1o1...ynon) if r1...rn−1=0 and rn = V (y1o1...ynon)
0 otherwise
(35)
where xi= rioi. If the environment is a minimax player (32) plus a crude teacher
V , i.e. if µAI is the true prior probability, the question now is, what is the behavior
y˙AIk of the AIµ agent. It turns out that if we set mk = n the AIµ agent is also a
minimax player (33) and hence optimal (y˙AIk = y˙
SG
k , see [Hut00, Hut04] for a formal
proof). Playing a sequence of games is a special case of a factorizable µ described in
Section 2.7 with identical factors µr for all r and equal episode lengths nr+1−nr=n.
Hence, in a minimax environment AIµ behaves itself as a minimax strategy,
y˙AIk = argmaxyk
min
ok
... max
y(r+1)n
min
o(r+1)n
V (y˙o˙rn+1:k−1...yok:(r+1)n) (36)
with r such that rn<k≤ (r+1)n and for any choice of mk as long as the horizon
hk≥n.
Using the AIξ Model for Game Playing. When going from the specific AIµ
model, where the rules of the game are explicitly modeled into the prior probability
µAI, to the universal model AIξ, we have to ask whether these rules can be learned
from the assigned rewards rk. Here, the main reason for studying the case of repeated
games rather than just one game arises. For a single game there is only one cycle
of nontrivial feedback, namely the end of the game, which is too late to be useful
except when further games follow.
We expect that no other learning scheme (with no extra information) can learn
the game more quickly than AIξ, since µAI factorizes in the case of games of fixed
length, i.e. µAI satisfies a strong separability condition. In the case of variable
game length the entanglement is also low. µAI should still be sufficiently separable,
allowing us to formulate and prove good reward bounds for AIξ. A qualitative
argument goes as follows:
Since initially, AIξ loses all games, it tries to draw out a loss as long as possible,
without having ever experienced or even knowing what it means to win. Initially,
AIξ will make a lot of illegal moves. If illegal moves abort the game resulting in
(non-delayed) negative reward (loss), AIξ can quickly learn the typically simple
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rules concerning legal moves, which usually constitute most of the rules; just the
goal rule is missing. After having learned the move-rules, AIξ learns the (negatively
rewarded) losing positions, the positions leading to losing positions, etc., so it can
try to draw out losing games. For instance, in chess, avoiding being check mated
for 20, 30, 40 moves against a master is already quite an achievement. At this
ability stage, AIξ should be able to win some games by luck, or speculate about a
symmetry in the game that check mating the opponent will be positively rewarded.
Once having found out the complete rules (moves and goal), AIξ will right away
reason that playing minimax is best, and henceforth beat all grandmasters.
If a (complex) game cannot be learned in this way in a realistic number of
cycles, one has to provide more feedback. This could be achieved by intermediate
help during the game. The environment could give positive (negative) feedback for
every good (bad) move the agent makes. The demand on whether a move is to be
valuated as good should be adapted to the gained experience of the agent in such a
way that approximately the better half of the moves are valuated as good and the
other half as bad, in order to maximize the information content of the feedback.
For more complicated games like chess, even more feedback may be necessary
from a practical point of view. One way to increase the feedback far beyond a
few bits per cycle is to train the agent by teaching it good moves. This is called
supervised learning. Despite the fact that the AIµ model has only a reward feedback
rk, it is able to learn supervised, as will be shown in Section 5.4. Another way would
be to start with more simple games containing certain aspects of the true game and
to switch to the true game when the agent has learned the simple game.
No other difficulties are expected when going from µ to ξ. Eventually ξAI will
converge to the minimax strategy µAI. In the more realistic case, where the envi-
ronment is not a perfect minimax player, AIξ can detect and exploit the weakness
of the opponent.
Finally, we want to comment on the input/output space X /Y of the AI models.
In practical applications, Y will possibly include also illegal moves. If Y is the set
of moves of, e.g. a robotic arm, the agent could move a wrong figure or even knock
over the figures. A simple way to handle illegal moves yk is by interpreting them as
losing moves, which terminate the game. Further, if, e.g. the input xk is the image
of a video camera which makes one shot per move, X is not the set of moves by the
environment but includes the set of states of the game board. The discussion in this
section handles this case as well. There is no need to explicitly design the systems
I/O space X /Y for a specific game.
The discussion above on the AIξ agent was rather informal for the following rea-
son: game playing (the SGξ agent) has (nearly) the same complexity as fully general
AI, and quantitative results for the AIξ agent are difficult (but not impossible) to
obtain.
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5.3 Function Minimization (FM)
Applications/examples. There are many problems that can be reduced to
function minimization (FM) problems. The minimum of a (real-valued) function
f :Y→ IR over some domain Y or a good approximate to the minimum has to be
found, usually with some limited resources.
One popular example is the traveling salesman problem (TSP). Y is the set of
different routes between towns, and f(y) the length of route y∈Y . The task is to
find a route of minimal length visiting all cities. This problem is NP hard. Getting
good approximations in limited time is of great importance in various applications.
Another example is the minimization of production costs (MPC), e.g. of a car, un-
der several constraints. Y is the set of all alternative car designs and production
methods compatible with the specifications and f(y) the overall cost of alternative
y∈Y . A related example is finding materials or (bio)molecules with certain prop-
erties (MAT), e.g. solids with minimal electrical resistance or maximally efficient
chlorophyll modifications, or aromatic molecules that taste as close as possible to
strawberry. We can also ask for nice paintings (NPT). Y is the set of all existing or
imaginable paintings, and f(y) characterizes how much person A likes painting y.
The agent should present paintings which A likes.
For now, these are enough examples. The TSP is very rigorous from a mathe-
matical point of view, as f , i.e. an algorithm of f , is usually known. In principle,
the minimum could be found by exhaustive search, were it not for computational
resource limitations. For MPC, f can often be modeled in a reliable and sufficiently
accurate way. For MAT you need very accurate physical models, which might be
unavailable or too difficult to solve or implement. For NPT all we have is the
judgement of person A on every presented painting. The evaluation function f can-
not be implemented without scanning A’s brain, which is not possible with today’s
technology.
So there are different limitations, some depending on the application we have
in mind. An implementation of f might not be available, f can only be tested
at some arguments y and f(y) is determined by the environment. We want to
(approximately) minimize f with as few function calls as possible or, conversely,
find an as close as possible approximation for the minimum within a fixed number
of function evaluations. If f is available or can quickly be inferred by the agent
and evaluation is quick, it is more important to minimize the total time needed to
imagine new trial minimum candidates plus the evaluation time for f . As we do
not consider computational aspects of AIξ till Section 6 we concentrate on the first
case, where f is not available or dominates the computational requirements.
The greedy model. The FM model consists of a sequence y˙1z˙1y˙2z˙2... where y˙k is
a trial of the FM agent for a minimum of f and z˙k=f(y˙k) is the true function value
returned by the environment. We randomize the model by assuming a probability
distribution µ(f) over the functions. There are several reasons for doing this. We
might really not know the exact function f , as in the NPT example, and model our
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uncertainty by the probability distribution µ. What is more important, we want
to parallel the other AI classes, like in the SPµ model, where we always started
with a probability distribution µ that was finally replaced by ξ to get the universal
Solomonoff prediction SPξ. We want to do the same thing here. Further, the
probabilistic case includes the deterministic case by choosing µ(f)= δff0, where f0
is the true function. A final reason is that the deterministic case is trivial when µ
and hence f0 are known, as the agent can internally (virtually) check all function
arguments and output the correct minimum from the very beginning.
We assume that Y is countable and that µ is a discrete measure, e.g. by taking
only computable functions. The probability that the function values of y1,...,yn are
z1,...,zn is then given by
µFM(y1z1...ynzn) :=
∑
f :f(yi)=zi ∀1≤i≤n
µ(f) (37)
We start with a model that minimizes the expectation zk of the function value f for
the next output yk, taking into account previous information:
y˙k := argmin
yk
∑
zk
zk ·µ(y˙1z˙1...y˙k−1z˙k−1ykzk)
This type of greedy algorithm, just minimizing the next feedback, was sufficient for
sequence prediction (SP) and is also sufficient for classification (CF, not described
here). It is, however, not sufficient for function minimization as the following exam-
ple demonstrates.
Take f : {0,1} → {1,2,3,4}. There are 16 different functions which shall be
equiprobable, µ(f)= 1
16
. The function expectation in the first cycle
〈z1〉 :=
∑
z1
z1 ·µ(y1z1) = 14
∑
z1
z1 =
1
4
(1+2+3+4) = 2.5
is just the arithmetic average of the possible function values and is independent of
y1. Therefore, y˙1=0, if we define argmin to take the lexicographically first minimum
in an ambiguous case like here. Let us assume that f0(0)=2, where f0 is the true
environment function, i.e. z˙1=2. The expectation of z2 is then
〈z2〉 :=
∑
z2
z2 ·µ(02y2z2) =
{
2 for y2 = 0
2.5 for y2 = 1
For y2=0 the agent already knows f(0)=2, for y2=1 the expectation is, again, the
arithmetic average. The agent will again output y˙2=0 with feedback z˙2=2. This
will continue forever. The agent is not motivated to explore other y’s as f(0) is
already smaller than the expectation of f(1). This is obviously not what we want.
The greedy model fails. The agent ought to be inventive and try other outputs when
given enough time.
The general reason for the failure of the greedy approach is that the information
contained in the feedback zk depends on the output yk. A FM agent can actively
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influence the knowledge it receives from the environment by the choice in yk. It
may be more advantageous to first collect certain knowledge about f by an (in
greedy sense) nonoptimal choice for yk, rather than to minimize the zk expectation
immediately. The nonminimality of zk might be overcompensated in the long run
by exploiting this knowledge. In SP, the received information is always the current
bit of the sequence, independent of what SP predicts for this bit. This is why a
greedy strategy in the SP case is already optimal.
The general FMµ/ξ model. To get a useful model we have to think more carefully
about what we really want. Should the FM agent output a good minimum in the
last output in a limited number of cycles m, or should the average of the z1,...,zm
values be minimal, or does it suffice that just one of the z is as small as possible?
The subtle and important differences between these settings have been analyzed and
discussed in detail in [Hut00, Hut04]. In the following we concentrate on minimizing
the average, or equivalently the sum of function values. We define the FMµ model
as to minimize the sum z1+...+zm. Building the µ average by summation over the zi
and minimizing w.r.t. the yi has to be performed in the correct chronological order.
With a similar reasoning as in (7) to (11) we get
y˙FMk = argminyk
∑
zk
...min
ym
∑
zm
(z1+ ...+zm)·µ(y˙1z˙1...y˙k−1z˙k−1ykzk...ymzm) (38)
By construction, the FMµ model guarantees optimal results in the usual sense that
no other model knowing only µ can be expected to produce better results. The
interesting case (in AI) is when µ is unknown. We define for this case, the FMξ
model by replacing µ(f) with some ξ(f), which should assign high probability to
functions f of low complexity. So we might define ξ(f)=
∑
q:∀x[U(qx)=f(x)]2
−ℓ(q). The
problem with this definition is that it is, in general, undecidable whether a TM q is
an implementation of a function f . ξ(f) defined in this way is uncomputable, not
even approximable. As we only need a ξ analogous to the l.h.s. of (37), the following
definition is natural
ξFM(y1z1...ynzn) :=
∑
q:q(yi)=zi ∀1≤i≤n
2−ℓ(q) (39)
ξFM is actually equivalent to inserting the uncomputable ξ(f) into (37). One can
show that ξFM is an enumerable semimeasure and dominates all enumerable proba-
bility distributions of the form (37).
Alternatively, we could have constrained the sum in (39) by q(y1...yn)= z1...zn
analogous to (21), but these two definitions are not equivalent. Definition (39)
ensures the symmetry15 in its arguments and ξFM(...yz...yz′...)=0 for z 6= z′. It in-
corporates all general knowledge we have about function minimization, whereas (21)
does not. But this extra knowledge has only low information content (complexity
15See [Sol99] for a discussion on symmetric universal distributions on unordered data.
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of O(1)), so we do not expect FMξ to perform much worse when using (21) instead
of (39). But there is no reason to deviate from (39) at this point.
We can now define a loss LFMµm as (38) with k=1 and argminy1 replaced by miny1
and, additionally, µ replaced by ξ for LFMξm . We expect |LFMξm −LFMµm | to be bounded
in a way that justifies the use of ξ instead of µ for computable µ, i.e. computable f0
in the deterministic case. The arguments are the same as for the AIξ model.
In [Hut00, Hut04] it has been proven that FMξ is inventive in the sense that
it never ceases searching for minima, but will test all y ∈Y if Y is finite (and an
infinite set of different y’s if Y is infinite) for sufficiently large horizon m. There are
currently no rigorous results on the quality of the guesses, but for the FMµ agent
the guesses are optimal by definition. If K(µ) for the true distribution µ is finite,
we expect the FMξ agent to solve the ‘exploration versus exploitation’ problem in
a universally optimal way, as ξ converges rapidly to µ.
Using the AI Models for Function Mininimization. The AI models can be
used for function minimization in the following way. The output yk of cycle k is a
guess for a minimum of f , like in the FM model. The reward rk should be high
for small function values zk=f(yk). The choice rk=−zk for the reward is natural.
Here, the feedback is not binary but rk ∈R⊂ IR, with R being a countable subset
of IR, e.g. the computable reals or all rational numbers. The feedback ok should be
the function value f(yk). As this is already provided in the rewards rk we could
set ok= ǫ as in Section 5.1. For a change and to see that the choice really does not
matter we set ok=zk here. The AIµ prior probability is
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
{
µFM(y1z1...ynzn) for rk = −zk, ok = zk, xk = rkok
0 else.
(40)
Inserting this into (10) with mk=m one can show that y˙
AI
k = y˙
FM
k , where y˙
FM
k has
been defined in (38). The proof is very simple since the FM model has already a
rather general structure, which is similar to the full AI model.
We expect no problem in going from FMξ to AIξ. The only thing the AIξ model
has to learn, is to ignore the o feedbacks as all information is already contained in
r. This task is simple as every cycle provides one data point for a simple function
to learn.
Remark on TSP. The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) seems to be trivial in
the AIµ model but nontrivial in the AIξ model, because (38) just implements an
internal complete search, as µ(f)= δffTSP contains all necessary information. AIµ
outputs, from the very beginning, the exact minimum of fTSP. This “solution” is, of
course, unacceptable from a performance perspective. As long as we give no efficient
approximation ξc of ξ, we have not contributed anything to a solution of the TSP
by using AIξc. The same is true for any other problem where f is computable and
easily accessible. Therefore, TSP is not (yet) a good example because all we have
done is to replace an NP complete problem with the uncomputable AIξ model or
by a computable AIξc model, for which we have said nothing about computation
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time yet. It is simply an overkill to reduce simple problems to AIξ. TSP is a simple
problem in this respect, until we consider the AIξc model seriously. For the other
examples, where f is inaccessible or complicated, an AIξc model would provide a
true solution to the minimization problem as an explicit definition of f is not needed
for AIξ and AIξc. A computable version of AIξ will be defined in Section 6.
5.4 Supervised Learning from Examples (EX)
The developed AI models provide a frame for reinforcement learning. The envi-
ronment provides feedback r, informing the agent about the quality of its last (or
earlier) output y; it assigns reward r to output y. In this sense, reinforcement
learning is explicitly integrated into the AIµ/ξ models. AIµ maximizes the true
expected reward, whereas the AIξ model is a universal, environment-independent
reinforcement learning algorithm.
There is another type of learning method: Supervised learning by presentation
of examples (EX). Many problems learned by this method are association problems
of the following type. Given some examples o∈R⊂O, the agent should reconstruct,
from a partially given o′, the missing or corrupted parts, i.e. complete o′ to o such
that relation R contains o. In many cases, O consists of pairs (z,v), where v is the
possibly missing part.
Applications/examples. Learning functions by presenting (z,f(z)) pairs and ask-
ing for the function value of z by presenting (z,?) falls into the category of supervised
learning from examples, e.g. f(z) may be the class label or category of z.
A basic example is learning properties of geometrical objects coded in some way.
For instance, if there are 18 different objects characterized by their size (small or
big), their colors (red, green, or blue) and their shapes (square, triangle, or circle),
then (object,property)∈R if the object possesses the property. Here, R is a relation
that is not the graph of a single-valued function.
When teaching a child by pointing to objects and saying “this is a tree” or
“look how green” or “how beautiful”, one establishes a relation of (object,property)
pairs in R. Pointing to a (possibly different) tree later and asking “what is this ?”
corresponds to a partially given pair (object,?), where the missing part “?” should
be completed by the child saying “tree”.
A final example we want to give is chess. We have seen that, in principle, chess
can be learned by reinforcement learning. In the extreme case the environment
only provides reward r = 1 when the agent wins. The learning rate is probably
inacceptable from a practical point of view, due to the low amount of information
feedback. A more practical method of teaching chess is to present example games in
the form of sensible (board-state,move) sequences. They contain information about
legal and good moves (but without any explanation). After several games have
been presented, the teacher could ask the agent to make its own move by presenting
(board-state,?) and then evaluate the answer of the agent.
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Supervised learning with the AIµ/ξ model. Let us define the EX model as
follows: The environment presents inputs ok−1 = zkvk ≡ (zk,vk) ∈ R∪(Z×{?}) ⊂
Z×(Y∪{?})=O to the agent in cycle k−1. The agent is expected to output yk
in the next cycle, which is evaluated with rk=1 if (zk,yk)∈R and 0 otherwise. To
simplify the discussion, an output yk is expected and evaluated even when vk( 6=?) is
given. To complete the description of the environment, the probability distribution
µR(o1...on) of the examples and questions oi (depending on R) has to be given.
Wrong examples should not occur, i.e. µR should be 0 if oi 6∈R∪(Z×{?}) for some
1≤ i≤ n. The relations R might also be probability distributed with σ(R). The
example prior probability in this case is
µ(o1...on) =
∑
R
µR(o1...on)·σ(R) (41)
The knowledge of the valuation rk on output yk restricts the possible relations R,
consistent with R(zk,yk)= rk, where R(z,y) := 1 if (z,y)∈R and 0 otherwise. The
prior probability for the input sequence x1...xn if the output sequence of AIµ is
y1...yn, is therefore
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
∑
R:∀1<i≤n[R(zi,yi)=ri]
µR(o1...on)·σ(R)
where xi= rioi and oi−1= zivi with vi ∈Y∪{?}. In the I/O sequence y1x1y2x2...=
y1r1z2v2y2r2z3v3... the y1r1 are dummies, after that regular behavior starts with
example (z2,v2).
The AIµ model is optimal by construction of µAI. For computable prior µR and
σ, we expect a near-optimal behavior of the universal AIξ model if µR addition-
ally satisfies some separability property. In the following, we give some motivation
why the AIξ model takes into account the supervisor information contained in the
examples and why it learns faster than by reinforcement.
We keep R fixed and assume µR(o1...on)=µR(o1)·...·µR(on) 6=0⇔ oi∈R∪(Z×
{?}) ∀i to simplify the discussion. Short codes q contribute most to ξAI(y1x1...ynxn).
As o1...on is distributed according to the computable probability distribution µR, a
short code of o1...on for large enough n is a Huffman code w.r.t. the distribution
µR. So we expect µR and hence R to be coded in the dominant contributions to
ξAI in some way, where the plausible assumption was made that the y on the input
tape do not matter. Much more than one bit per cycle will usually be learned, i.e.
relation R will be learned in n≪K(R) cycles by appropriate examples. This coding
of R in q evolves independently of the feedbacks r. To maximize the feedback rk,
the agent has to learn to output a yk with (zk,yk)∈R. The agent has to invent a
program extension q′ to q, which extracts zk from ok−1=(zk,?) and searches for and
outputs a yk with (zk,yk)∈R. As R is already coded in q, q′ can reuse this coding
of R in q. The size of the extension q′ is, therefore, of order 1. To learn this q′, the
agent requires feedback r with information content O(1)=K(q′) only.
Let us compare this with reinforcement learning, where only ok−1=(zk,?) pairs
are presented. A coding of R in a short code q for o1...on is of no use and will
46 Marcus Hutter, Technical Report, IDSIA-01-03
therefore be absent. Only the rewards r force the agent to learn R. q′ is therefore
expected to be of size K(R). The information content in the r’s must be of the
order K(R). In practice, there are often only very few rk=1 at the beginning of the
learning phase, and the information content in r1...rn is much less than n bits. The
required number of cycles to learn R by reinforcement is, therefore, at least but in
many cases much larger than K(R).
Although AIξ was never designed or told to learn supervised, it learns how to
take advantage of the examples from the supervisor. µR and R are learned from the
examples; the rewards r are not necessary for this process. The remaining task of
learning how to learn supervised is then a simple task of complexity O(1), for which
the rewards r are necessary.
5.5 Other Aspects of Intelligence
In AI, a variety of general ideas and methods have been developed. In the previous
subsections, we saw how several problem classes can be formulated within AIξ. As
we claim universality of the AIξ model, we want to illuminate which of and how
the other AI methods are incorporated in the AIξ model by looking at its structure.
Some methods are directly included, while others are or should be emergent. We do
not claim the following list to be complete.
Probability theory and utility theory are the heart of the AIµ/ξ models. The prob-
ability ξ is a universal belief about the true environmental behavior µ. The utility
function is the total expected reward, called value, which should be maximized.
Maximization of an expected utility function in a probabilistic environment is usu-
ally called sequential decision theory, and is explicitly integrated in full generality in
our model. In a sense this includes probabilistic (a generalization of deterministic)
reasoning, where the objects of reasoning are not true and false statements, but
the prediction of the environmental behavior. Reinforcement Learning is explicitly
built in, due to the rewards. Supervised learning is an emergent phenomenon (Sec-
tion 5.4). Algorithmic information theory leads us to use ξ as a universal estimate
for the prior probability µ.
For horizon >1, the expectimax series in (10) and the process of selecting maxi-
mal values may be interpreted as abstract planning. The expectimax series is a form
of informed search, in the case of AIµ, and heuristic search, for AIξ, where ξ could
be interpreted as a heuristic for µ. The minimax strategy of game playing in case
of AIµ is also subsumed. The AIξ model converges to the minimax strategy if the
environment is a minimax player, but it can also take advantage of environmental
players with limited rationality. Problem solving occurs (only) in the form of how
to maximize the expected future reward.
Knowledge is accumulated by AIξ and is stored in some form not specified further
on the work tape. Any kind of information in any representation on the inputs y is
exploited. The problem of knowledge engineering and representation appears in the
form of how to train the AIξ model. More practical aspects, like language or image
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processing, have to be learned by AIξ from scratch.
Other theories, like fuzzy logic, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, ... are
partly outdated and partly reducible to Bayesian probability theory [Che85, Che88].
The interpretation and consequences of the evidence gap g :=1−∑xkξ(yx<kyxk)>0
in ξ may be similar to those in Dempster-Shafer theory. Boolean logical reasoning
about the external world plays, at best, an emergent role in the AIξ model.
Other methods that do not seem to be contained in the AIξ model might also
be emergent phenomena. The AIξ model has to construct short codes of the en-
vironmental behavior, and AIXItl (see next section) has to construct short action
programs. If we would analyze and interpret these programs for realistic environ-
ments, we might find some of the unmentioned or unused or new AI methods at
work in these programs. This is, however, pure speculation at this point. More
important: when trying to make AIξ practically usable, some other AI methods,
like genetic algorithms or neural nets, especially for I/O pre/postprocessing, may
be useful.
The main thing we wanted to point out is that the AIξ model does not lack
any important known property of intelligence or known AI methodology. What
is missing, however, are computational aspects, which are addressed in the next
section.
6 Time-Bounded AIXI Model
Until now, we have not bothered with the non-computability of the universal prob-
ability distribution ξ. As all universal models in this paper are based on ξ, they are
not effective in this form. In this section, we outline how the previous models and
results can be modified/generalized to the time-bounded case. Indeed, the situation
is not as bad as it could be. ξ is enumerable and y˙k is still approximable, i.e. there
exists an algorithm that will produce a sequence of outputs eventually converging
to the exact output y˙k, but we can never be sure whether we have already reached
it. Besides this, the convergence is extremely slow, so this type of asymptotic com-
putability is of no direct (practical) use, but will nevertheless be important later.
Let p˜ be a program that calculates within a reasonable time t˜ per cycle, a rea-
sonable intelligent output, i.e. p˜(x˙<k)= y˙1:k. This sort of computability assumption,
that a general-purpose computer of sufficient power is able to behave in an intelli-
gent way, is the very basis of AI, justifying the hope to be able to construct agents
that eventually reach and outperform human intelligence. For a contrary viewpoint
see [Luc61, Pen89, Pen94]. It is not necessary to discuss here what is meant by ‘rea-
sonable time/intelligence’ and ‘sufficient power’. What we are interested in, in this
section, is whether there is a computable version AIXIt˜ of the AIξ agent that is su-
perior or equal to any p with computation time per cycle of at most t˜. By ‘superior’,
we mean ‘more intelligent’, so what we need is an order relation for intelligence, like
the one in Definition 10.
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The best result we could think of would be an AIXIt˜ with computation time
≤ t˜ at least as intelligent as any p with computation time ≤ t˜. If AI is possible at
all, we would have reached the final goal: the construction of the most intelligent
algorithm with computation time ≤ t˜. Just as there is no universal measure in the
set of computable measures (within time t˜), neither may such an AIXIt˜ exist.
What we can realistically hope to construct is an AIXIt˜ agent of computation
time c· t˜ per cycle for some constant c. The idea is to run all programs p of length
≤ l˜ :=ℓ(p˜) and time ≤ t˜ per cycle and pick the best output. The total computation
time is c · t˜ with c = 2l˜. This sort of idea of ‘typing monkeys’ with one of them
eventually writing Shakespeare, has been applied in various forms and contexts in
theoretical computer science. The realization of this best vote idea, in our case, is not
straightforward and will be outlined in this section. A related idea is that of basing
the decision on the majority of algorithms. This ‘democratic vote’ idea was used in
[LW94, Vov92] for sequence prediction, and is referred to as ‘weighted majority’.
6.1 Time-Limited Probability Distributions
In the literature one can find time-limited versions of Kolmogorov complexity [Dal73,
Dal77, Ko86] and the time-limited universal semimeasure [LV91, LV97, Sch02]. In
the following, we utilize and adapt the latter and see how far we get. One way
to define a time-limited universal chronological semimeasure is as a mixture over
enumerable chronological semimeasures computable within time t˜ and of size at
most l˜.
ξ t˜l˜(yx1:n) :=
∑
ρ : ℓ(ρ)≤l˜ ∧ t(ρ)≤t˜
2−ℓ(ρ)ρ(yx1:n) (42)
One can show that ξ t˜l˜ reduces to ξAI defined in (21) for t˜,l˜→∞. Let us assume that
the true environmental prior probability µAI is equal to or sufficiently accurately
approximated by a ρ with ℓ(ρ) ≤ l˜ and t(ρ) ≤ t˜ with t˜ and l˜ of reasonable size.
There are several AI problems that fall into this class. In function minimization of
Section 5.3, the computation of f and µFM are often feasible. In many cases, the
sequences of Section 5.1 that should be predicted, can be easily calculated when µSP
is known. In a classification problem, the probability distribution µCF, according
to which examples are presented, is, in many cases, also elementary. But not all
AI problems are of this ‘easy’ type. For the strategic games of Section 5.2, the
environment itself is usually a highly complex strategic player with a µSG that is
difficult to calculate, although one might argue that the environmental player may
have limited capabilities too. But it is easy to think of a difficult-to-calculate physical
(probabilistic) environment like the chemistry of biomolecules.
The number of interesting applications makes this restricted class of AI prob-
lems, with time- and space-bounded environment µt˜l˜, worthy of study. Superscripts
to a probability distribution except for ξ t˜l˜ indicate their length and maximal com-
putation time. ξ t˜l˜ defined in (42), with a yet to be determined computation time,
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multiplicatively dominates all µt˜l˜ of this type. Hence, an AIξ t˜l˜ model, where we use
ξ t˜l˜ as prior probability, is universal, relative to all AIµt˜l˜ models in the same way
as AIξ is universal to AIµ for all enumerable chronological semimeasures µ. The
argmaxyk in (22) selects a yk for which ξ
t˜l˜ has the highest expected utility Vkmk ,
where ξ t˜l˜ is the weighted average over the ρt˜l˜; i.e. output y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k is determined by a
weighted majority. We expect AIξ t˜l˜ to outperform all (bounded) AIρt˜l˜, analogous
to the unrestricted case.
In the following we analyze the computability properties of ξ t˜l˜ and AIξ t˜l˜, i.e. of
y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k . To compute ξ
t˜l˜ according to the definition (42) we have to enumerate all
chronological enumerable semimeasures ρt˜l˜ of length ≤ l˜ and computation time ≤ t˜.
This can be done similarly to the unbounded case as described in [LV97, Hut00,
Hut04]. All 2l˜ enumerable functions of length ≤ l˜, computable within time t˜ have to
be converted to chronological probability distributions. For this, one has to evaluate
each function for |X |·k different arguments. Hence, ξ t˜l˜ is computable within time16
t(ξ t˜l˜(yx1:k))=O(|X |·k ·2l˜· t˜). The computation time of y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k depends on the size of
X , Y and mk. ξ t˜l˜ has to be evaluated |Y|hk|X |hk times in (22). It is possible to
optimize the algorithm and perform the computation within time
t(y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k ) = O(|Y|hk|X |hk ·2l˜ · t˜) (43)
per cycle. If we assume that the computation time of µt˜l˜ is exactly t˜ for all
arguments, the brute-force time t¯ for calculating the sums and maxs in (11) is
t¯(y˙AIµ
t˜l˜
k )≥|Y|hk |X |hk · t˜. Combining this with (43), we get
t(y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k ) = O(2
l˜ · t¯(y˙AIµt˜l˜k ))
This result has the proposed structure, that there is a universal AIξ t˜l˜ agent with
computation time 2l˜ times the computation time of a special AIµt˜l˜ agent.
Unfortunately, the class of AIµt˜l˜ systems with brute-force evaluation of y˙k accord-
ing to (11) is completely uninteresting from a practical point of view. For instance,
in the context of chess, the above result says that the AIξ t˜l˜ is superior within time
2l˜·t˜ to any brute-force minimax strategy of computation time t˜. Even if the factor of
2l˜ in computation time would not matter, the AIξ t˜l˜ agent is, nevertheless practically
useless, as a brute-force minimax chess player with reasonable time t˜ is a very poor
player.
Note that in the case of binary sequence prediction (hk =1, |Y|= |X |=2) the
computation time of ρ coincides with that of y˙AIρk within a factor of 2. The class
AIρt˜l˜ includes all non-incremental sequence prediction algorithms of length ≤ l˜ and
computation time ≤ t˜/2. By non-incremental, we mean that no information of
previous cycles is taken into account for speeding up the computation of y˙k of the
current cycle.
16We assume that a (Turing) machine can be simulated by another in linear time.
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The shortcomings (mentioned and unmentioned ones) of this approach are cured
in the next subsection by deviating from the standard way of defining a time-
bounded ξ as a sum over functions or programs.
6.2 The Idea of the Best Vote Algorithm
A general agent is a chronological program p(x<k)=y1:k. This form, introduced in
Section 2.4, is general enough to include any AI system (and also less intelligent
systems). In the following, we are interested in programs p of length ≤ l˜ and com-
putation time ≤ t˜ per cycle. One important point in the time-limited setting is that
p should be incremental, i.e. when computing yk in cycle k, the information of the
previous cycles stored on the work tape can be reused. Indeed, there is probably no
practically interesting, non-incremental AI system at all.
In the following, we construct a policy p∗, or more precisely, policies p∗k for every
cycle k that outperform all time- and length-limited AI systems p. In cycle k, p∗k
runs all 2l˜ programs p and selects the one with the best output yk. This is a ‘best
vote’ type of algorithm, as compared to the ‘weighted majority’ type algorithm of
the last subsection. The ideal measure for the quality of the output would be the
ξ-expected future reward
V pξkm(y˙x˙<k) :=
∑
q∈Q˙k
2−ℓ(q)V pqkm , V
pq
km := r(x
pq
k ) + ... + r(x
pq
m) (44)
The program p that maximizes V pξkmk should be selected. We have dropped the nor-
malization N unlike in (24), as it is independent of p and does not change the order
relation in which we are solely interested here. Furthermore, without normalization,
V ∗ξkm(y˙x˙<k) :=maxp∈P˙V
pξ
km(y˙x˙<k) is enumerable, which will be important later.
6.3 Extended Chronological Programs
In the functional form of the AIξ model it was convenient to maximize Vkmk over all
p∈ P˙k, i.e. all p consistent with the current history y˙x˙<k. This was not a restriction,
because for every possibly inconsistent program p there exists a program p′ ∈ P˙k
consistent with the current history and identical to p for all future cycles ≥k. For
the time-limited best vote algorithm p∗ it would be too restrictive to demand p∈P˙k.
To prove universality, one has to compare all 2l˜ algorithms in every cycle, not just
the consistent ones. An inconsistent algorithm may become the best one in later
cycles. For inconsistent programs we have to include the y˙k into the input, i.e.
p(y˙x˙<k)=y
p
1:k with y˙i 6=ypi possible. For p∈P˙k this was not necessary, as p knows the
output y˙k≡ypk in this case. The rpqi in the definition of Vkm are the rewards emerging
in the I/O sequence, starting with y˙x˙<k (emerging from p
∗) and then continued by
applying p and q with y˙i :=y
p
i for i≥k.
Another problem is that we need Vkmk to select the best policy, but unfortunately
Vkmk is uncomputable. Indeed, the structure of the definition of Vkmk is very similar
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to that of y˙k, hence a brute-force approach to approximate Vkmk requires too much
computation time as for y˙k. We solve this problem in a similar way, by supplementing
each p with a program that estimates Vkmk by w
p
k within time t˜. We combine the
calculation of ypk and w
p
k and extend the notion of a chronological program once
again to
p(y˙x˙<k) = w
p
1y
p
1...w
p
ky
p
k (45)
with chronological order wp1y
p
1 y˙1x˙1w
p
2y
p
2 y˙2x˙2....
6.4 Valid Approximations
Policy p might suggest any output ypk but it is not allowed to rate it with an arbi-
trarily high wpk if we want w
p
k to be a reliable criterion for selecting the best p. We
demand that no policy is allowed to claim that it is better than it actually is. We
define a (logical) predicate VA(p) called valid approximation, which is true if and
only if p always satisfies wpk≤V pξkmk , i.e. never overrates itself.
VA(p) ≡ [∀k∀wp1yp1 y˙1x˙1...wpkypk : p(y˙x˙<k)=wp1yp1...wpkypk ⇒ wpk ≤ V pξkmk(y˙x˙<k)] (46)
In the following, we restrict our attention to programs p, for which VA(p) can be
proven in some formal axiomatic system. A very important point is that V ∗ξkmk is
enumerable. This ensures the existence of sequences of programs p1,p2,p3,... for
which VA(pi) can be proven and limi→∞w
pi
k =V
∗ξ
kmk
for all k and all I/O sequences.
pi may be defined as the naive (nonhalting) approximation scheme (by enumeration)
of V ∗ξkmk terminated after i time steps and using the approximation obtained so far
for wpik together with the corresponding output y
pi
k . The convergence w
pi
k
i→∞−→V ∗ξkmk
ensures that V ∗ξkmk , which we claimed to be the universally optimal value, can be
approximated by p with provable VA(p) arbitrarily well, when given enough time.
The approximation is not uniform in k, but this does not matter as the selected p
is allowed to change from cycle to cycle.
Another possibility would be to consider only those p that check wpk≤V pξkmk online
in every cycle, instead of the pre-check VA(p), either by constructing a proof (on the
work tape) for this special case, or wpk≤V pξkmk is already evident by the construction
of wpk. In cases where p cannot guarantee w
p
k≤V pξkmk it sets wk=0 and, hence, trivially
satisfies wpk≤ V pξkmk . On the other hand, for these p it is also no problem to prove
VA(p) as one has simply to analyze the internal structure of p and recognize that p
shows the validity internally itself, cycle by cycle, which is easy by assumption on
p. The cycle-by-cycle check is therefore a special case of the pre-proof of VA(p).
6.5 Effective Intelligence Order Relation
In Section 4.1 we introduced an intelligence order relation  on AI systems, based
on the expected reward V pξkmk . In the following we need an order relation c based
on the claimed reward wpk which might be interpreted as an approximation to .
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Definition 13 (Effective intelligence order relation) We call p effectively
more or equally intelligent than p′ if
p c p′ :⇔ ∀k∀y˙x˙<k∃w1:nw′1:n :
p(y˙x˙<k)=w1∗ ...wk∗ ∧ p′(y˙x˙<k)=w′1∗ ...w′k∗ ∧ wk≥w′k,
i.e. if p always claims higher reward estimate w than p′.
Relation c is a co-enumerable partial order relation on extended chronological
programs. Restricted to valid approximations it orders the policies w.r.t. the quality
of their outputs and their ability to justify their outputs with high wk.
6.6 The Universal Time-Bounded AIXItl Agent
In the following, we describe the algorithm p∗ underlying the universal time-bounded
AIXIt˜l˜ agent. It is essentially based on the selection of the best algorithms p∗k out
of the time t˜ and length l˜ bounded p, for which there exists a proof of VA(p) with
length ≤ lP .
1. Create all binary strings of length lP and interpret each as a coding of a
mathematical proof in the same formal logic system in which VA(·) was for-
mulated. Take those strings that are proofs of VA(p) for some p and keep the
corresponding programs p.
2. Eliminate all p of length >l˜.
3. Modify the behavior of all retained p in each cycle k as follows: Nothing is
changed if p outputs some wpky
p
k within t˜ time steps. Otherwise stop p and
write wk=0 and some arbitrary yk to the output tape of p. Let P be the set
of all those modified programs.
4. Start first cycle: k :=1.
5. Run every p ∈ P on extended input y˙x˙<k, where all outputs are redirected
to some auxiliary tape: p(y˙x˙<k) = w
p
1y
p
1...w
p
ky
p
k. This step is performed in-
crementally by adding y˙x˙k−1 for k > 1 to the input tape and continuing the
computation of the previous cycle.
6. Select the program p with highest claimed reward wpk: p
∗
k :=argmaxpw
p
k.
7. Write y˙k :=y
p∗
k
k to the output tape.
8. Receive input x˙k from the environment.
9. Begin next cycle: k :=k+1, goto step 5.
It is easy to see that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 14 (Optimality of AIXItl) Let p be any extended chronological (incre-
mental) program like (45) of length ℓ(p)≤ l˜ and computation time per cycle t(p)≤ t˜,
for which there exists a proof of VA(p) defined in (46) of length ≤lP . The algorithm
p∗ constructed in the last paragraph, which depends on l˜, t˜ and lP but not on p, is
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effectively more or equally intelligent, according to c (see Definition 13) than any
such p. The size of p∗ is ℓ(p∗)=O(log(l˜·t˜·lP )), the setup-time is tsetup(p∗)=O(l2P ·2lP )
and the computation time per cycle is tcycle(p
∗)=O(2l˜ · t˜).
Roughly speaking, the theorem says that if there exists a computable solution to
some or all AI problems at all, the explicitly constructed algorithm p∗ is such a
solution. Although this theorem is quite general, there are some limitations and
open questions that we discuss in the next subsection.
The construction of the algorithm p∗ needs the specification of a formal logic
system (∀,λ,yi,ci,fi,Ri,→,∧,=,...), and axioms, and inference rules. A proof is a
sequence of formulas, where each formula is either an axiom or inferred from previous
formulas in the sequence by applying the inference rules. Details can be found in
[Hut02a] in a related construction or in any textbook on logic or proof theory, e.g.
[Fit96, Sho67]. We only need to know that provability and Turing Machines can be
formalized. The setup time in the theorem is just the time needed to verify the 2lP
proofs, each needing time O(l2P ).
6.7 Limitations and Open Questions
• Formally, the total computation time of p∗ for cycles 1...k increases linearly
with k, i.e. is of order O(k) with a coefficient 2l˜ · t˜. The unreasonably large
factor 2l˜ is a well-known drawback in best/democratic vote models and will be
taken without further comments, whereas the factor t˜ can be assumed to be
of reasonable size. If we do not take the limit k→∞ but consider reasonable
k, the practical significance of the time bound on p∗ is somewhat limited due
to the additional additive constant O(l2P ·2lP ). It is much larger than k·2l˜ · t˜ as
typically lP≫ℓ(VA(p))≥ℓ(p)≡ l˜.
• p∗ is superior only to those p that justify their outputs (by large wpk). It
might be possible that there are p that produce good outputs ypk within rea-
sonable time, but it takes an unreasonably long time to justify their outputs
by sufficiently high wpk. We do not think that (from a certain complexity level
onwards) there are policies where the process of constructing a good output
is completely separated from some sort of justification process. But this jus-
tification might not be translatable (at least within reasonable time) into a
reasonable estimate of V pξkmk .
• The (inconsistent) programs p must be able to continue strategies started by
other policies. It might happen that a policy p steers the environment to a
direction for which p is specialized. A “foreign” policy might be able to displace
p only between loosely connected episodes. There is probably no problem for
factorizable µ. Think of a chess game, where it is usually very difficult to
continue the game or strategy of a different player. When the game is over, it
is usually advantageous to replace a player by a better one for the next game.
There might also be no problem for sufficiently separable µ.
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• There might be (efficient) valid approximations p for which VA(p) is true but
not provable, or for which only a very long (>lP ) proof exists.
6.8 Remarks
• The idea of suggesting outputs and justifying them by proving reward bounds
implements one aspect of human thinking. There are several possible reactions
to an input. Each reaction possibly has far-reaching consequences. Within a
limited time one tries to estimate the consequences as well as possible. Finally,
each reaction is valuated, and the best one is selected. What is inferior to
human thinking is that the estimates wpk must be rigorously proved and the
proofs are constructed by blind exhaustive search, further, that all behaviors
p of length ≤ l˜ are checked. It is inferior “only” in the sense of necessary
computation time but not in the sense of the quality of the outputs.
• In practical applications there are often cases with short and slow programs
ps performing some task T , e.g. the computation of the digits of π, for which
there exist long but quick programs pl too. If it is not too difficult to prove that
this long program is equivalent to the short one, then it is possible to prove
Kt(pl)(T )
+≤ ℓ(ps) with Kt being the time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity.
Similarly, the method of proving bounds wk for Vkmk can give high lower
bounds without explicitly executing these short and slow programs, which
mainly contribute to Vkmk .
• Dovetailing all length- and time-limited programs is a well-known elementary
idea (e.g. typing monkeys). The crucial part that was developed here, is the
selection criterion for the most intelligent agent.
• The construction of AIXIt˜l˜ and the enumerability of Vkmk ensure arbitrary
close approximations of Vkmk , hence we expect that the behavior of AIXIt˜l˜
converges to the behavior of AIξ in the limit t˜,l˜,lP→∞, in some sense.
• Depending on what you know or assume that a program p of size l˜ and com-
putation time per cycle t˜ is able to achieve, the computable AIXIt˜l˜ model
will have the same capabilities. For the strongest assumption of the existence
of a Turing machine that outperforms human intelligence, AIXIt˜l˜ will do too,
within the same time frame up to an (unfortunately very large) constant factor.
7 Discussion
This section reviews what has been achieved in the article and discusses some other-
wise unmentioned topics of general interest. We remark on various topics, including
concurrent actions and perceptions, the choice of the I/O spaces, treatment of en-
crypted information, and peculiarities of mortal embodies agents. We continue with
an outlook on further research. Since many ideas have already been presented in the
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various sections, we concentrate on nontechnical open questions of general impor-
tance, including optimality, down-scaling, implementation, approximation, elegance,
extra knowledge, and training of/for AIXI(tl). We also include some (personal) re-
marks on non-computable physics, the number of wisdom Ω, and consciousness. As
it should be, the article concludes with conclusions.
7.1 General Remarks
Game theory. In game theory [OR94] one often wants to model the situation
of simultaneous actions, whereas the AIξ models have serial I/O. Simultaneity can
be simulated by withholding the environment from the current agent’s output yk,
until xk has been received by the agent. Formally, this means that µ(yx<kyxk) is
independent of the last output yk. The AIξ agent is already of simultaneous type in
an abstract view if the behavior p is interpreted as the action. In this sense, AIXI
is the action p∗ that maximizes the utility function (reward), under the assumption
that the environment acts according to ξ. The situation is different from game
theory, as the environment ξ is not a second ‘player’ that tries to optimize his own
utility (see Section 5.2).
Input/output spaces. In various examples we have chosen differently specialized
input and output spaces X and Y . It should be clear that, in principle, this is
unnecessary, as large enough spaces X and Y (e.g. the set of strings of length 232)
serve every need and can always be Turing-reduced to the specific presentation
needed internally by the AIXI agent itself. But it is clear that, using a generic
interface, such as camera and monitor for learning tic-tac-toe, for example, adds the
task of learning vision and drawing.
How AIXI(tl) deals with encrypted information. Consider the task of
decrypting a message that was encrypted by a public key encrypter like RSA. A
message m is encrypted using a product n of two large primes p1 and p2, resulting in
encrypted message c=RSA(m|n). RSA is a simple algorithm of size O(1). If AIXI is
given the public key n and encrypted message c, in order to reconstruct the original
message m it only has to “learn” the function RSA−1(c|n) := RSA(c|p1,p2) =m.
RSA−1 can itself be described in length O(1), since RSA is O(1) and p1 and p2 can
be reconstructed from n. Only very little information is needed to learn O(1) bits.
In this sense decryption is easy for AIXI (like TSP, see Section 5.3). The problem
is that while RSA is efficient, RSA−1 is an extremely slow algorithm, since it has
to find the prime factors from the public key. But note, in AIXI we are not talking
about computation time, we are only talking about information efficiency (learning
in the least number of interaction cycles). One of the key insights in this article
that allowed for an elegant theory of AI was this separation of data efficiency from
computation time efficiency. Of course, in the real world computation time matters,
so we invented AIXItl. AIXItl can do every job as well as the best length l and
time t bounded agent, apart from time factor 2l and a huge offset time. No practical
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offset time is sufficient to find the factors of n, but in theory, enough offset time
allows also AIXItl to (once-and-for-all) find the factorization, and then, decryption
is easy of course.
Mortal embodied agents. The examples we gave in this article, particularly those
in Section 5, were mainly bodiless agents: predictors, gamblers, optimizers, learn-
ers. There are some peculiarities with reinforcement learning autonomous embodied
robots in real environments.
We can still reward the robot according to how well it solves the task we want it
to do. A minimal requirement is that the robot’s hardware functions properly. If the
robot starts to malfunction its capabilities degrade, resulting in lower reward. So,
in an attempt to maximize reward, the robot will also maintain itself. The problem
is that some parts will malfunction rather quickly when no appropriate actions are
performed, e.g. flat batteries, if not recharged in time. Even worse, the robot may
work perfectly until the battery is nearly empty, and then suddenly stop its operation
(death), resulting in zero reward from then on. There is too little time to learn how
to maintain itself before it’s too late. An autonomous embodied robot cannot start
from scratch but must have some rudimentary built-in capabilities (which may not
be that rudimentary at all) that allow it to at least survive. Animals survive due
to reflexes, innate behavior, an internal reward attached to the condition of their
organs, and a guarding environment during childhood. Different species emphasize
different aspects. Reflexes and innate behaviors are stressed in lower animals versus
years of safe childhood for humans. The same variety of solutions is available for
constructing autonomous robots (which we will not detail here).
Another problem connected, but possibly not limited to embodied agents, espe-
cially if they are rewarded by humans, is the following: Sufficiently intelligent agents
may increase their rewards by psychologically manipulating their human “teachers”,
or by threatening them. This is a general sociological problem which successful AI
will cause, which has nothing specifically to do with AIXI. Every intelligence supe-
rior to humans is capable of manipulating the latter. In the absence of manipulable
humans, e.g. where the reward structure serves a survival function, AIXI may di-
rectly hack into its reward feedback. Since this is unlikely to increase its long-term
survival, AIXI will probably resist this kind of manipulation (just as most humans
don’t take hard drugs, due to their long-term catastrophic consequences).
7.2 Outlook & Open Questions
Many ideas for further studies were already stated in the various sections of the
article. This outlook only contains nontechnical open questions regarding AIXI(tl)
of general importance.
Value bounds. Rigorous proofs for non-asymptotic value bounds for AIξ are the
major theoretical challenge – general ones, as well as tighter bounds for special
environments µ, e.g. for rapidly mixing mdps, and/or other performance criteria
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have to be found and proved. Although not necessary from a practical point of
view, the study of continuous classesM, restricted policy classes, and/or infinite Y ,
X and m may lead to useful insights.
Scaling AIXI down. A direct implementation of the AIXItl model is, at best,
possible for small-scale (toy) environments due to the large factor 2l in computation
time. But there are other applications of the AIXI theory. We saw in several
examples how to integrate problem classes into the AIXI model. Conversely, one
can downscale the AIξ model by using more restricted forms of ξ. This could be
done in the same way as the theory of universal induction was downscaled with
many insights to the Minimum Description Length principle [LV92a, Ris89] or to
the domain of finite automata [FMG92]. The AIXI model might similarly serve as a
supermodel or as the very definition of (universal unbiased) intelligence, from which
specialized models could be derived.
Implementation and approximation. With a reasonable computation time, the
AIXI model would be a solution of AI (see the next point if you disagree). The
AIXItl model was the first step, but the elimination of the factor 2l without giving
up universality will almost certainly be a very difficult task.17 One could try to select
programs p and prove VA(p) in a more clever way than by mere enumeration, to
improve performance without destroying universality. All kinds of ideas like genetic
algorithms, advanced theorem provers and many more could be incorporated. But
now we have a problem.
Computability. We seem to have transferred the AI problem just to a different
level. This shift has some advantages (and also some disadvantages) but does not
present a practical solution. Nevertheless, we want to stress that we have reduced the
AI problem to (mere) computational questions. Even the most general other systems
the author is aware of depend on some (more than complexity) assumptions about
the environment or it is far from clear whether they are, indeed, universally optimal.
Although computational questions are themselves highly complicated, this reduction
is a nontrivial result. A formal theory of something, even if not computable, is often
a great step toward solving a problem and also has merits of its own, and AI should
not be different in this respect (see previous item).
Elegance. Many researchers in AI believe that intelligence is something complicated
and cannot be condensed into a few formulas. It is more a combining of enough
methods and much explicit knowledge in the right way. From a theoretical point
of view we disagree, as the AIXI model is simple and seems to serve all needs.
From a practical point of view we agree to the following extent: To reduce the
computational burden one should provide special-purpose algorithms (methods) from
the very beginning, probably many of them related to reduce the complexity of the
input and output spaces X and Y by appropriate pre/postprocessing methods.
Extra knowledge. There is no need to incorporate extra knowledge from the very
17But see [Hut02a] for an elegant theoretical solution.
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beginning. It can be presented in the first few cycles in any format. As long as the
algorithm to interpret the data is of size O(1), the AIXI agent will “understand” the
data after a few cycles (see Section 5.4). If the environment µ is complicated but
extra knowledge z makes K(µ|z) small, one can show that the bound (17) reduces
roughly to ln2·K(µ|z) when x1≡z, i.e. when z is presented in the first cycle. The
special-purpose algorithms could be presented in x1 too, but it would be cheating to
say that no special-purpose algorithms were implemented in AIXI. The boundary
between implementation and training is unsharp in the AIXI model.
Training. We have not said much about the training process itself, as it is not
specific to the AIXI model and has been discussed in literature in various forms
and disciplines [Sol86, Sch03, Sch04]. By a training process we mean a sequence of
simple-to-complex tasks to solve, with the simpler ones helping in learning the more
complex ones. A serious discussion would be out of place. To repeat a truism, it is,
of course, important to present enough knowledge ok and evaluate the agent output
yk with rk in a reasonable way. To maximize the information content in the reward,
one should start with simple tasks and give positive reward to approximately the
better half of the outputs yk.
7.3 The Big Questions
This subsection is devoted to the big questions of AI in general and the AIXI model
in particular with a personal touch.
On non-computable physics & brains. There are two possible objections to AI
in general and, therefore, to AIXI in particular. Non-computable physics (which is
not too weird) could make Turing computable AI impossible. As at least the world
that is relevant for humans seems mainly to be computable we do not believe that
it is necessary to integrate non-computable devices into an AI system. The (clever
and nearly convincing) Go¨del argument by Penrose [Pen89, Pen94], refining Lucas
[Luc61], that non-computational physics must exist and is relevant to the brain, has
(in our opinion convincing) loopholes.
Evolution & the number of wisdom. A more serious problem is the evolutionary
information-gathering process. It has been shown that the ‘number of wisdom’ Ω
contains a very compact tabulation of 2n undecidable problems in its first n binary
digits [Cha91]. Ω is only enumerable with computation time increasing more rapidly
with n than any recursive function. The enormous computational power of evolution
could have developed and coded something like Ω into our genes, which significantly
guides human reasoning. In short: Intelligence could be something complicated,
and evolution toward it from an even cleverly designed algorithm of size O(1) could
be too slow. As evolution has already taken place, we could add the information
from our genes or brain structure to any/our AI system, but this means that the
important part is still missing, and that it is principally impossible to derive an
efficient algorithm from a simple formal definition of AI.
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Consciousness. For what is probably the biggest question, that of consciousness,
we want to give a physical analogy. Quantum (field) theory is the most accurate and
universal physical theory ever invented. Although already developed in the 1930s,
the big question, regarding the interpretation of the wave function collapse, is still
open. Although this is extremely interesting from a philosophical point of view, it
is completely irrelevant from a practical point of view.18 We believe the same to be
valid for consciousness in the field of Artificial Intelligence: philosophically highly
interesting but practically unimportant. Whether consciousness will be explained
some day is another question.
7.4 Conclusions
The major theme of the article was to develop a mathematical foundation of Ar-
tificial Intelligence. This is not an easy task since intelligence has many (often
ill-defined) faces. More specifically, our goal was to develop a theory for rational
agents acting optimally in any environment. Thereby we touched various scientific
areas, including reinforcement learning, algorithmic information theory, Kolmogorov
complexity, computational complexity theory, information theory and statistics,
Solomonoff induction, Levin search, sequential decision theory, adaptive control the-
ory, and many more.
We started with the observation that all tasks that require intelligence to be
solved can naturally be formulated as a maximization of some expected utility in
the framework of agents. We presented a functional (3) and an iterative (11) formu-
lation of such a decision-theoretic agent in Section 2, which is general enough to cover
all AI problem classes, as was demonstrated by several examples. The main remain-
ing problem is the unknown prior probability distribution µ of the environment(s).
Conventional learning algorithms are unsuitable, because they can neither handle
large (unstructured) state spaces, nor do they converge in the theoretically minimal
number of cycles, nor can they handle non-stationary environments appropriately.
On the other hand, Solomonoff’s universal prior ξ (16), rooted in algorithmic infor-
mation theory, solves the problem of the unknown prior distribution for induction
problems as was demonstrated in Section 3. No explicit learning procedure is neces-
sary, as ξ automatically converges to µ. We unified the theory of universal sequence
prediction with the decision-theoretic agent by replacing the unknown true prior µ by
an appropriately generalized universal semimeasure ξ in Section 4. We gave various
arguments that the resulting AIXI model is the most intelligent, parameter-free and
environmental/application-independent model possible. We defined an intelligence
order relation (Definition 10) to give a rigorous meaning to this claim. Furthermore,
possible solutions to the horizon problem have been discussed. In Section 5 we out-
lined how the AIXI model solves various problem classes. These included sequence
prediction, strategic games, function minimization and, especially, learning to learn
18In the Theory of Everything, the collapse might become of ‘practical’ importance and must or
will be solved.
60 Marcus Hutter, Technical Report, IDSIA-01-03
supervised. The list could easily be extended to other problem classes like classifica-
tion, function inversion and many others. The major drawback of the AIXI model is
that it is uncomputable, or more precisely, only asymptotically computable, which
makes an implementation impossible. To overcome this problem, we constructed
a modified model AIXItl, which is still effectively more intelligent than any other
time t and length l bounded algorithm (Section 6). The computation time of AIXItl
is of the order t·2l. A way of overcoming the large multiplicative constant 2l was
presented in [Hut02a] at the expense of an (unfortunately even larger) additive con-
stant. Possible further research was discussed. The main directions could be to
prove general and special reward bounds, use AIXI as a supermodel and explore
its relation to other specialized models, and finally improve performance with or
without giving up universality.
All in all, the results show that Artificial Intelligence can be framed by an el-
egant mathematical theory. Some progress has also been made toward an elegant
computational theory of intelligence.
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sophical touch are [LV92b, Sol97]. For an older general review of inductive inference
see Angluin [AS83].
Sequential decision theory. The other ingredient in our AIξ model is sequential
decision theory. We do not need much more than the maximum expected utility
principle and the expectimax algorithm [Mic66, RN03]. The book of von Neumann
and Morgenstern [NM44] might be seen as the initiation of game theory, which
already contains the expectimax algorithm as a special case. The literature on
reinforcement learning and sequential decision theory is vast and we refer to the
references given in the textbooks [SB98, BT96].
The author’s contributions. Details on most of the issues addressed in this arti-
cle can be found in various reports or publications or the book [Hut04] by the author:
The AIξ model was first introduced and discussed in March 2000 in [Hut00] in a 62-
page-long report. More succinct descriptions were published in [Hut01d, Hut01e].
The AIξ model has been argued to formally solve a number of problem classes,
including sequence prediction, strategic games, function minimization, reinforce-
ment and supervised learning [Hut00]. A variant of AIξ has recently been shown
to be self-optimizing and Pareto optimal [Hut02b]. The construction of a general
fastest algorithm for all well-defined problems [Hut02a] arose from the construc-
tion of the time-bounded AIXItl model [Hut01d]. Convergence [Hut03b] and tight
[Hut03c] error [Hut01c, Hut01a] and loss [Hut01b, Hut03a] bounds for Solomonoff’s
universal sequence prediction scheme have been proven. Loosely related ideas on
a market/economy-based reinforcement learner [KHS01b] and gradient-based rein-
forcement planner [KHS01a] were implemented. These and other papers are avail-
able at http://www.idsia.ch/∼marcus/ai.
Acknowledgements. I am indebted to Shane Legg who proof-read this article.
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